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Abstract
This thesis comprises three chapters that provide insights into consumer ra-
tionality and consideration sets using revealed preference theory, and a decision
theoretic approach to status quo bias.
Chapter 1 studies the presence of consideration sets through the lens of eco-
nomic rationality from the perspective of revealed preference theory. In addition,
I propose a new index of rationality (GAV Index) to accompany two commonly
used measures (CCEI & MPI), which are applied to a scanner panel dataset and
a simulated dataset. Under minimal restrictions, I detect the effects of exoge-
nous consideration set formation on a household’s ability to make rational bundle
choices. There are also several key demographic factors that correlate well with
rationality. This remains true when controlling for the (average) size of the consid-
eration sets households use; these results suggest that a simpler decision-making
process with fewer goods can lead to choices that are more rational. Overall, the
use of consideration sets as a behavioural heuristic can seemingly benefit con-
sumers by enhancing their decision-making process.
Chapter 2 semi-parametrically estimates costs associated with consideration
sets using revealed preference theory. The theorem provided ensures there are
testable implications of a parsimonious model of consideration sets. Cost of con-
sideration can be estimated in proportion to expenditure and is heterogeneous
across consumers. Using the Stanford Basket Dataset, the model cannot reject
the use of consideration sets in the presence of suitable restrictions. On average,
the average consideration set cost is approximately 2% of monthly expenditure.
Additionally, there appears to be a strong link between the consumer’s cost of
consideration and rationality level.
Chapter 3 proposes a choice theory that explains status quo bias (SQB) with
the concept of just-noticeable differences (JNDs). SQB comes from an inclination
to choose a default option/current choice when decision-making, whereas a JND
is the minimal stimulus required to perceive change. JND utility can be consid-
ered a general representation of SQB; it is shown that the SQB representation of
Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) is a special case. As such, an agent will only move away
from a current choice position if there exist other alternatives that are noticeably
better, otherwise, the agent does not shift away, hence leading to a bias towards
the status quo.1
1Additionally, I show that it is possible to aggregate JND preferences over a finite number
of characteristics in ways that are consistent with the final choice of good/s (with or without
SQB).
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Impact Statement
In terms of the academic impact, all of the essays provide new perspectives and
techniques that allow economists to relax many assumptions that are considered
standard. Chapters 1 and 2 have a strong focus on consumer rationality and
consideration sets. Chapter 3 has direct bearing on the way in which status quo
bias is normally thought of in the economics literature.
Chapter 1 provides a new measure of rationality which is easily implementable
and interpretable. Chapters 1 and 2 incorporate the notion of consideration sets
into the standard revealed preference framework, in which there has been a lack of
research. These chapters directly impact the way economists think of rationality
because i) size of consideration sets are strongly correlated with rationality ii) a
(fixed) cost of consideration can provide a healthy and natural explanation for a
lot of what is measured as irrationality.
An exciting sub-field of economics is behavioural decision theory. It plays a
massive role in the economics profession; to make behavioural economics rigorous
in a way that is deep-rooted in economic theory. This is exactly what Chapter 3
does vis-a`-vis status quo bias. Chapter 3 provides an alternative and parsimonious
way of describing behaviour that is consistent with status quo bias through an
axiomatisation.
The cornerstone of my academic career has been to help economists understand
consumer behaviour so that we can be better informed and, as such, be more
informative. Chapters 1 and 2 highlight an important issue that consumers may
not necessarily evaluate every single product they have ever come across. However,
it may be welfare improving if i) consumers are more aware of other products, if
they are very limited in their choices, or ii) consumers concentrate on a finite
set of choices to avoid obfuscation. These chapters show that there is a balance
between quality of decision-making and quantity of available choices. This has
many beneficial implications for the consumers themselves (commonly referred to
as ‘nudges’ ), marketing departments/firms, and delivery of public services.2
Chapter 3 highlights an issue that is far-reaching in both academic and non-
academic settings. People are not always able to make perfect comparisons. The
decision-making process can be tricky, especially in settings that involve complex
processes. Many individuals rely on heuristics or fall back on their status quo.
Unless there is a choice that is substantively better than their current decision,
people may decide not to switch away. From a welfare stance, it is essential to try
to understand why individuals have this switching cost and if there are ways of
‘nudging’ people to make objectively better decisions. This chapter analyses one
avenue of this in terms of status quo bias.3
All of these chapters are self-contained papers and have been presented at
various academic conferences and seminars. My ultimate goal for these is to
improve and refine them in order to achieve publications in top economics journals.
2People can often feel overwhelmed or confused when having to make decisions that are not
commonplace, or are difficult e.g. financial decisions, medical health etc...
3A common example that often arises is the choice of pensions. Individuals seem to stick with
their default pension scheme despite there existing a plethora of information and opportunity to
change.
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Preface
In recent years, there has been a surge in the literature on the incorporation of
psychology into economics as a way of relaxing the standard assumptions that are
normally associated with homo economicus, with its commonplace nomenclature
being behavioural economics.
It is in this respect, that the following thesis chapters contribute directly to
the economics literature. Broadly speaking, the essays incorporate a deeper under-
standing and appreciation of human decision-making processes, in terms of con-
sumer (ir)rationality, and behavioural biases. Methodologically, they contribute
to the use of revealed preference theory and decision theory as a means of describ-
ing and predicting behaviour. In particular, the use of revealed preference theory
allows for rigorous theory to precede naturally to empirical analyses.
Inspired by the parsimony of revealed preference theory, the first chapter of this
thesis introduces an alternative measure of the violations of the generalised axiom
of revealed preference (GARP), called the GAV Index. It is based on the concept
of the exploitation of irrational decisions via a profiteering arbitrager who wishes
to extract consumer surplus by essentially buying rational bundles, and selling
back irrational bundles. However, one of the main issues of rationality indices is
deciding the scale upon which we measure rationality. In essence, ‘How irrational
does a decision have to be to consider an individual irrational?’. Exploiting the
fact that there is price mis-measurement, the GAV Index can be manipulated
and restructured in a way that it can be used to statistically test whether the
hypothesis of consumer rationality can be rejected or not.
The main purpose of chapter 1 is to study the presence of consideration sets
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using revealed preference theory through the lens of economic rationality. Using
three measures of rationality, applied to a scanner panel dataset and a simulated
dataset, there is evidence to suggest that a household’s decision-making process
may be substantially improved by breaking up their bundle choices by different
consideration sets, as opposed to just one large consideration set. Whether con-
sumers are able to benefit from making decisions, based on consideration sets, can
be detected by using these measures of rationality. Using the Stanford Basket
Dataset (and simulations), various analyses throughout points to the importance
of incorporating the notion consideration sets in revealed preference arguments.
There is also evidence to suggest that certain demographic factors can correlate
well with rationality levels, as well as the complexity of decision-making via the
(average) number of goods per consideration set. Interestingly, this suggests that
larger consideration sets do not necessarily yield better results for the household,
suggesting some other form of behavioural effects may be at play, e.g. choice
overload, or a cost of consideration. This naturally segues into chapter 2.
Using revealed preference theory, this chapter semi-parametrically estimates
the costs associated with consideration sets in the decision making process. The
theorem provided ensures there are testable implications of a parsimonious model
of consideration sets. The model essentially incorporates a fixed cost of consider-
ation for any alternative/good that is purchased. As per the theorem presented,
this can be thought of as a price distortion whereby choices can be rationalised by
prices that are higher than the observed ones, up to a certain level. The cost of
consideration can be heterogeneously estimated in proportion to expenditure. Us-
ing the Stanford Basket Dataset, the model cannot reject the use of consideration
sets in the presence of suitable and minimal restrictions. On average, the average
consideration set cost is approximately 2% of monthly expenditure. Additionally,
there appears to be a strong link between the consumer’s cost of consideration
and their level of rationality.
For the final chapter, I propose a rational choice theory that explains the
well-documented phenomenon of status quo bias (SQB) with the concept of just-
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noticeable differences (JNDs). From behavioural economics, SQB is thought of as
an inclination to choose a default option/current choice, for example, individuals
tend to stick with their default pensions schemes, or choose the same set of goods
in the supermarkets. However, from economic theory (and econophysics), a JND
is the minimal level of stimulus required to be able to perceive change, for ex-
ample, individuals typically had not noticed the reduction in the weights of their
commonly purchased foods (e.g. chocolate bars etc...) until there was a significant
difference. I show that choice behaviour that is consistent with SQB can also be
represented by JND utility. The key notion behind this is that an individual does
not move away from their current choice, unless there are other options that are
noticeably better. Given that JND utility can yield a potential explanation for
SQB.6
Following the last essay, there is a remaining section that concludes in terms of
summarising the chapters and outlining a route for future research in behavioural
economics, both theoretically and empirically. For practicality, the majority of
the accompanying tables and figures are resigned to the appendices, alongside the
lengthier proofs and derivations.7
6I also show that it is possible to aggregate JND preferences over characteristics of goods.
This is to say that, if goods are thought of as a finite collection of characteristics, this chapter
also shows that there is a consistent way to aggregate these preferences over these characteristics
to the standard case or the JND utility case.
7There may be overlaps in the literature reviews in the respective chapters. They are left as
intended as the same papers offer various insights for different chapters. Where there are any
other overlaps, this is to ensure that each chapter is also self-contained, allowing the reader to
concentrate on specific chapters, if they so wish.
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Chapter 1
Consideration Sets and
Rationality: Is Revealed
Preference Theory Revealing
Enough?
1.1 Introduction
1 Consumer rationality is one of the fundamental assumptions of standard eco-
nomic theory. The extent to which this can be measured is subjective, in that,
there are infinitely many ways to be irrational, but, by definition, only one bench-
mark for being truly rational. Through revealed preference theory, it is possible
to rank bundles through a chain of choices, as described by weak inequality con-
straints, even if the bundles are not directly compared. If the inequality constraints
fail to hold mutually, the data are not consistent with revealed preference theory.
However, there is very little in the current literature that combines the notion
of consideration sets with rationality despite their natural links. Commonly seen
in the marketing literature, initially proposed by Wright and Barbour (1977), the
1For this chapter, I would like to express immense gratitude to Syngjoo Choi for his continuing
support and guidance, during and after his tenure at UCL.
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consideration set is seen to be a subset of the total number of alternatives with
which the consumer makes a choice. As per the description in Horowitz and
Louviere (1995), the set of alternatives that the consumer actually uses to make
their decision “need not coincide with the set of all possible alternatives”. This
leads to the natural combination of revealed preference theory and consideration
sets, as both concepts deal with consumer choice through the principle of a natural
ranking.
Specifically, linking consideration sets and rationality offers a potentially ex-
citing insight into bounded rationality. A reason why economists might observe
behaviour consistent with bounded rationality is that there is the notion of a cost
that is associated with gaining more information that could aid the consumer in
their decision-making process. The role of consideration sets supports this idea
as, for whatever reason, the consumer only uses a subset of the total set of al-
ternatives, as the cost of expanding the consideration set is potentially too high.
In some sense, the consideration set provides additional restrictions on consumers
as it also deals with the subset of alternatives. Revealed preference inequalities
would then allow a ranking and testing of rationality on the basis of using only
the consideration set. Combining these concepts can provide a more reasonable
model of consumer choice and behaviour in general. Chapter 1 will focus on the
perspective of rationality and consideration sets, with Chapter 2 concentrating on
the cost of consideration.
This chapter attempts to explore the importance of taking into account consid-
eration sets when doing any analysis involving revealed preference theory through
commonly used rationality indices. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 explain the relevant topics
related to revealed preference theory that will be used throughout and how these
tie-in with consideration sets. Section 1.3 goes into further critical analysis and
theoretical details of the rationality indices used via consideration sets, as well as
providing hypotheses and predictions. Section 1.4 describes the empirical dataset
used in this chapter. Sections 1.5 and 1.6 explain the results of the model (includ-
ing regressions based on demographics), potential applications and implications
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for policy, and precautions that arise from combining revealed preference and con-
sideration sets. Section 1.7 describes the potential limitations and extensions of
the model, with Section 1.8 concluding.2
1.2 Related Literature
As mentioned previously, there is an absence of research in the literature linking
rationality and consideration sets. The 4 main papers in the literature that go into
detail on topics related to consideration sets and their applications to economic
theory and revealed preference are Manzini & Mariotti (2014), Masatlioglu, Naka-
jima & Ozbay (2012), Spiegler & Eliaz (2011), and Demuynck and Seel (2018).
Additionally, on the more econometric side of consideration sets, such as Chiang,
Chib & Narasimhan (1999), Horowitz & Louviere (1995) etc..., it is widely mod-
elled such that that the consideration set formation in decision-making is part of a
dual-staged process, the first stage being the ‘consideration stage’ and the second
stage being the ‘choice stage’.
Spiegler & Eliaz (2011) apply economic theory to the original application of
consideration sets, within a framework of marketing and competition. Their idea
behind the construction of the consideration set is via the consumer’s unaware-
ness of certain products and that a marketing strategy needs to be introduced
to consumers, even after they become aware of new products, in order to expand
their consideration set. Marketing is then a tool to overcome this information
asymmetry. They devise a model that seeks to encapsulate the consideration set
as a means for firms to somehow extract surplus from consumers as a result of
asymmetric information. Masatlioglu & Nakajima (2012) design a framework that
studies a more general framework of consumer behaviour those using consideration
sets in their decision-making process. The consideration set is formed as a func-
tion of an exogenous and feasible ‘starting point’ (F ). Let C1(F (0), Y ) ⊆ Y where
Y represents budget feasibility. The consumer makes choices based on C(F, Y )
2For further results and robustness, I refer the reader to Appendix A.3 that replicates the
analysis done in Section 1.3 with simulated data.
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with a binary relation operator on the complete set of alternatives, A. If the con-
sumer gets (at least) their starting point option, the decision-making process is
complete, if not, the consumer constructs a ‘smaller’ consideration set where the
new starting point is the previously rejected alternative i.e. C2(F (1), Y ), where
F (1) is the alternative that was rejected in the previous period; the process is then
iterated. Masatlioglu & Nakajima (2012) also propose a more realistic version of
their iterative model in that the initial starting point is inferred from the choice
data. Overall, Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2012) provide one of the more general
behavioural models with consideration sets.3
Manzini & Mariotti (2014) specifically model a boundedly rational consumer
whereby agents have a probability distribution over alternatives. They attempt
to infer the preference ordering from consumer choices under the notion that the
choices were generated by a consideration set where the consideration set is a
function of the larger set of alternatives. This is similar to the idea of Spiegler &
Eliaz (2011), however, the constructions of the consideration set are different in
both cases. Manzini & Mariotti (2014) put forward a model that suggests the for-
mation of consideration sets is random in the sense that all (feasible) alternatives
have a probability of being in the consideration set; they call this the ‘attention
parameter’.4 Their decision-making procedure involves a decision-maker with a
consideration set with a complete preference relation over the consideration set
(not just over the complete set of alternatives).
Masatlioglu, Nakajima & Ozbay (2012) is a highly related paper to Manzini
& Mariotti (2014) as both papers devise models that approach choice data and
consideration sets from limited attentions. The main idea behind Masatlioglu,
Nakajima & Ozbay (2012) is that, as a result of limited attention, there is some
form of ‘filtering’ of alternatives that occurs . A common property of the consid-
eration set is that an alternative that is not within the consideration set cannot
affect the consideration set even after it becomes unavailable (or infeasible). Under
3Spiegler & Eliaz (2011) can be seen as a special case of Masatlioglu & Nakajima (2012)
where the initial marketing device and initial alternative form the basis of the first consideration
set. The next stages of consideration set formation are then as a result of marketing.
4In the limited attention sense.
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this property, they are able to establish how this ‘filtering’ of alternatives occur
through the consumer’s choices. Their interpretation is that revealed preference
theory may only be a specific example of decision-making under consideration sets.
Similar in notion is the paper by Chiang, Chib & Narasimhan (1999) that proposes
a basic consideration set choice model that attempts to account for heterogeneity
in the construction of consideration sets through random effects. They find that
heterogeneity is an important factor (if not accounted for) as it can lead to an
over-reliance on pure preference relations and can undervalue the the impact of
marketing on consideration set construction. By using scanner data, they estimate
and compare results by including/excluding different brands of ketchup to derive
heterogeneity factors by iterating over all possible combinations of consideration
set based on ketchup brands.
Demuynck and Seel (2018) depart from the economic literature in that the
analysis is done from a revealed preference point of view; the most basic difference
being that choices a´ la Afriat are continuous (over a set of discrete goods). They
provide a new axiom of revealed preference, namely the Limited Axiom of Revealed
Preference (LARP). LARP involves verifying that GARP holds within partitions
of a dataset admitted by the same consideration sets. This allows an extension to
Afriat’s Theorem under limited consideration where goods that are not admitted
by a particular consideration set are incorporated via unobserved subjective prices.
Consideration set formation is then modelled via the beliefs put on those subjective
prices. Applied to a scanner dataset from the Denver area (USA), they largely fail
to reject the use of consideration sets in the consumers decision-making process.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the only paper that incorporates standard
revealed preference analysis with consideration sets.
Horowitz & Louviere (1995) investigate further the notion of a multi-stage
process in decision-making. Their particular paper attempts to test the basic
hypothesis of whether utility derived from alternatives within the consideration
set is higher than utility derived from any alternative not within the consideration
set. In this sense, preferences do not depend on the consideration set, rather, the
9
alternatives not in the consideration set yield lower utility. When estimating a
utility function, they propose that knowledge of a consumer’s consideration set
can improve the precision with with a utility function is measured.5
As from above, it is clear that there is a rich understanding of consideration
sets in the marketing literature and, more recently, a resurgence of research in the
fields of econometrics and economic theory. The consideration set, in essence, is
an unobservable, which makes it an relevant topic for econometricians to study,
whether it be parametric or non-parametric in nature. A more ‘micro-founded’
and ‘psychologically-based’ approach can be found in Gabaix (2014). Gabaix in-
troduces an elegant way of modifying basic microeconomic theory into that of a
sparsity-based model. The sparsity (based on limited attention) arises from the
consumer having to ignore many factors or alternatives in their decision-making
process. In effect, the cost of attention is incorporated into the maximisation pro-
cess, allowing for the manipulation of the standard textbook microeconomic mod-
els. This type of sparsity-based model encompasses many classes of behavioural
models, particularly related to bounded rationality.
Andreoni et. al (2011) provide much insight and guidance into the use of
rationality indices, their corresponding power, and their appropriate interpretation
when it comes to using revealed preference theory in empirical works.
1.3 Model & Theoretical Foundation
1.3.1 Definitions
This subsection familiarises the reader with the conventions of revealed preference
used throughout the thesis.
Let T denote time periods such that T = {1, 2, ..., T}6
Let pt ∈ Rn++ denote prices in period t ∈ T
Let qt ∈ Rn+ denote quantities in period t ∈ T
5If the utility function is fully observable, information of the consideration set does not aid
in modelling choice.
6Also commonly referred to as observations.
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where n denotes the total number of available goods.
Define a finite dataset, D, as a collection of all prices and quantities i.e. D =
{pt,qt}t∈T. This dataset is a collection of observed consumption behaviour, qt,
for a consumer facing prices, pt, at observation, t.
A dataset D = {pt,qt}t∈T is rationalisable if there exists a utility function
u : Rn → R and for all observations t ∈ T, there exists a weakly positive income
level yt such that:
qt ∈ argmaxu(q)
q
subject to p′tq ≤ yt
This says that a dataset is rationalisable if the bundles, {qt}t∈T, are consistent
with utility maximisation with a linear budget constraint.
A bundle qi is directly revealed preferred to qj if p
′
iqi ≥ p′iqj. In words, the
bundle qi was at least as affordable as bundle qj at observation i. Let R denote
the directly revealed preferred binary relation i.e. qi is directly revealed preferred
to qj if qiRqj.
A bundle qi is strictly directly revealed preferred to qj if p
′
iqi > p
′
iqj. In
words, the bundle qi was costlier than bundle qj at observation i. Let RS denote
the strictly directly revealed preferred binary relation i.e. qi is strictly directly
revealed preferred to qj if qiRSqj.
A bundle qi is indirectly revealed preferred to qj if there exists a sequence of
observations x, y, ..., z in T such that qiRqx,qxRqy, ...,qzRqj. Let P denote the
indirectly revealed preferred binary relation i.e. qi is indirectly revealed preferred
to qj if qiPqj.
7 The number of bundles in a chain of directly revealed preferred
bundles is called the sequence length.8
The Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) is satisfied by D =
{pt,qt}t∈T, if, for all qiPqj, then it cannot be that qjRSqi; if qi is indirectly
preferred to qj, it cannot be the case that qj was purchased even when qi is
cheaper.
7The indirectly revealed preferred binary relation is the transitive closure of R. It is the binary
relation that is transitive and minimal with respect to the set it is on.
8For example, qaRqb,qbRqc,qcRqd has a sequence length of 4.
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The seminal contribution of Afriat (1967) showed that GARP is both necessary
and sufficient for a dataset to be rationalisable.9 Given a dataset D = {pt,qt}t∈T
the following statements are equivalent:
(i) D is rationalisable by a locally non-satiated utility function
(ii) D satisfies GARP
(iii) For all observations t ∈ T, there exists ut, λ ∈ R and ut, λt ∈ R++ such that
for all pairs of observations i, j ∈ T
ui − uj ≤ λjpj′(qi − qj)
(iv) D is rationalisable by a strictly monotone and concave utility function.
where the inequalities of (iii) are called the Afriat inequalities. A neat interpreta-
tion of these come from the first order conditions of a constrained maximisation
problem using KKT conditions, where λt is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget
constraint at observation t (assuming differentiability and concavity).
Following Demuynck and Seel (2018), suppose a consumer has access to a
total of n goods i.e. she chooses a consumption bundle qt from a set of goods
G = {1, ..., n}. If the consumer does not necessarily take into account all n goods
when purchasing, the consumer is said to have used a consideration set It ⊆ G.
This means that consumption of any goods that lie outside of her consideration
set must be equal to zero (without excluding the option that goods within the
consideration set are also zero).
This leads to a natural definition of rationalisability with a consideration set.
A dataset D = {pt,qt}t∈T is rationalisable with consideration set if there exists a
utility function u : Rn → R and for all observations t ∈ T, there exists a weakly
9See Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973), Varian (1982b), Fostel et al. (2003) for detailed proofs of
Afriat’s Theorem.
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positive income level yt and consideration set It ⊆ G such that:
qt ∈ argmaxu(q)
q
subject to p′tq ≤ yt,
qi = 0 for all i 6∈ It
This says that a dataset is rationalisable if the bundles, {qt}t∈T, are con-
sistent with utility maximisation with a linear budget constraint and additional
constraints where the consumption of the ith good in qt is zero.
10
Now consider that within the consideration set, there may be some goods that
are considered and yet have zero consumption. Denote this set of goods with
positive consumption as Jt. By definition, it must be that Jt ⊆ It. Lemma 1 of
Demuynck and Seel (2018) shows that with rationalisability with limited consid-
eration, it is without loss of generality that It = JT can be assumed. The intuition
for the proof of this result is that there is an overlap in the additional negativity
constraints. The goods outside the consideration set have zero consumption, and
the goods in the consideration set but without positive consumption clearly have
zero consumption. With this overlap in constraints, it is without loss of generality
that only goods with positive consumption were considered; it is as if any good
with zero consumption was not considered.
Further to this, it follows that the defined dataset D = {pt,qt}t∈T can be
partitioned into observations where the consideration sets are the same as defined
by exactly the same goods of positive consumption. Two observations x, y are
said to be in the same partition if Ix = Iy. Let Ek ⊆ T denote the kth partition of
observations for which the consideration sets are the same such that
K⋃
k=1
Ek = T.
Hence, a dataset can be defined as D = {{pt,qt}t∈E1 , ..., {pt,qt}t∈EK}. For the
purposes of this chapter, I will be using this definition of consideration sets for the
following analyses.1112
10The ith component of qt is zero.
11See Demuynck and Seel (2018) for further details.
12For example, suppose there are 4 time periods and 10 goods. If in the first and second time
periods, only the first 5 goods were purchased, and in the third and fourth time periods, only the
other 5 goods were purchased, then observations from the first two time periods form a separate
partition to the last two time periods.
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1.3.2 Questions & Hypotheses
The overarching question of this chapter can be broken down as follows:
Q1 How is rationality affected by incorporating the role of consideration sets?
• Under the definition of consideration sets above, it is clear that there is
no role for empty bundles i.e. bundles with zero consumption for every
possible good. In essence, it is as if all the zero bundles are partitioned
into their own consideration set; any revealed preference test would
yield full rationality for this partition. This provides motivation for
excluding zero bundles from any revealed preference frameworks as they
will only essentially improve observed rationality in a trivial way. Given
this, it will be interesting to investigate whether rationality appears to
improve/worsen when looking at partitions of the dataset as defined by
the consideration set as opposed to over the whole dataset.
• Extending the rationale as above, some analysis can be done by compar-
ing rationality across consideration sets. One might hypothesise that
decision making is easier when there are fewer goods in a consideration
set.13 As such, it may be that consumers make bundle choices that are
more rational when there are not as many goods to consider.
Q2 Does rationality vary with different sequence lengths?
• Conditional on the same size of consideration set (i.e. same number
of goods chosen with positive consumption), it is conceivably possible
that a consumer may be more susceptible to an irrational bundle choice
given a longer sequence length. For example, if a consumer is using
a consideration set with five goods, is a consumer that has another
consideration set with five different goods, but over more time periods,
more likely to make an irrational choice? It may be that the assumption
of acyclicity is more likely to fail over longer time periods. For example,
13For example, choice overload, status quo bias, etc...
14
it may be easier not to form a cycle of preferences if we only look at
choices over three time periods, as opposed to, say, twelve.
Q3 Does the explanatory power of demographic variables change when controlling
for average consideration set size?
• Rationality can be very much considered an inherent characteristic of
an individual/household. On an individual level, the background be-
hind the decision-making process includes many other factors such as
education, family size etc... It may be the case that having fewer goods
to consider makes it easier for agents to make rational decisions, as
such, the average consideration set size may have a positive influence
on the measures of rationality. Similarly, given that the dataset is par-
titioned over observations, it may be possible that the average sequence
length per consideration set may also positively effect rationality.
1.3.3 Rationality Indices
1.3.3.1 Critical Cost Efficiency Index and Money Pump Index
Using the definitions of GARP and a sequence length, I can formally define the
MPI.
Definition: Money Pump Index (MPI)
Given a GARP-satisfying sequence of length T , the associated Money Pump Cost
(denoted by MT ) is:
MT =
T∑
i=1
p′i(qi − qi+1) (1.1)
with qT+1 = q1 for a full cycle of GARP
Standardising the Money Pump Cost yields the MPI:
MPIT =
MT
T∑
i=1
p′iqi
(1.2)
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In words, Echenique et. al (2011) describe a story of a ‘fictitious arbitrager’
who seeks to buy inefficient and consequently irrationally chosen bundles. This
arbitrager then sells the efficient and rational equivalents back to the irrational
household. The so-called ‘profit’ the arbitrager makes is given by the Money Pump
Cost above. This is, in effect, the extracted surplus from households. The MPI
then standardises this cost to make it comparable across all income levels. This
indicates that a household that scores a 0 MPI is perfectly rational as there is
no exploitable surplus; an MPI of nearly 1 suggests nearly all their income is
extracted from the arbitrager.14
Using the definitions pertaining to revealed preference theory, I can formally define
a relaxed version of GARP15 devised by Varian (1990, 1991) in order to derive the
CCEI.
A bundle qi is directly relaxed revealed preferred to qj if ep
′
iqi ≥ p′iqj, for
e ∈ [0, 1]. In words, the bundle qi chosen at a weakly lower income was at least
as affordable as bundle qj at observation i. Let R
d
e denote the directly relaxed
revealed preferred binary relation i.e. qi is directly relaxed revealed preferred
to qj if qiR
d
eqj. Let R
w
e denote the indirectly relaxed revealed preferred binary
relation.
With the above definitions, we can now define a relaxed version of GARP,
namely, Varian’s Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preference (VGARP). If qiR
w
e qj,
then e ∗ pj ∗ qj ≥ pj ∗ qi, e ∈ [0, 1]. By relaxing the budget at time j, what could
have originally been a violation of GARP, may not be considered a violation of
VGARP given an appropriate suppression of income, by factor e > 0.
Given this relaxed version of GARP, it is now possible to define a metric on the
revealed preferences which can measure the extent of (ir)rationality. Specifically,
we can define the Critical Cost Efficiency Index (CCEI) as the largest value of
e ≤ 1 such that no violations of VGARP exist, denoted e∗. Formally, the CCEI is
defined as the supremum over all e such that binary preference relations, Rde and
Rwe satisfy VGARP; thus the CCEI is exactly e
∗. In words, the CCEI measures how
14Further details can be found in Echenique et. al (2011).
15For simplicity, I denote this as VGARP.
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much income has to be relaxed in order to remove any violations of VGARP. In a
sense, it is a measure of how much income is being wasted as a result of choosing
GARP violating bundles; the amount of adjustment being equal to 1− e∗. Hence,
e∗ = 1 reverts back to no violations of GARP, thus, fully rational as there is no
need for any amount of income adjustment.16
As with all rationality indices, there is bound to be a certain level of overlap in
terms of their underlying idea. However, the main reason for focusing on the CCEI
and MPI is that their interpretations are very different. As discussed in the previ-
ous section, the CCEI is a measure of ‘consumer error’ in their consumption choice
which gives rise to the interpretation of ‘wasted income’. By contrast, the MPI
has the interpretation of a monetary value that is extracted from the consumer as
a result of irrational behaviour. As a consequence, the reactions of these indices
to the above questions can be very different; this allows the following analysis and
results to be more robust. In a sense, if the indices had similar interpretations,
then their effects through the different analyses could be (approximately) comple-
mentary. In essence, if different indices with different interpretations can tell the
same story, this leads to more robust and thorough analysis than using indices
with similar interpretations. Hence, the use of both the CCEI and MPI is key in
trying to answer the above questions.17 In a similar vein to the MPI, I introduce
a third index of rationality that could also be used.
16In practice, it is generally accepted to choose a critical value e above which a decision is
considered rational (Varian (1991) suggests 0.95 but respects its arbitrariness). Echenique et. al
(2011) devise a more robust way of deriving a critical value through measurement error in prices
(due to store coupons) which allow them to statistically test whether the MPI can reject or not
reject rational behaviour.
17An important point to note is that, for increasing sequence length, the CCEI and MPI are
more likely to differ, as pointed out in Echenique et. al (2011), adding to the robustness of the
results.
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1.3.3.2 Generalised Axioms Violation Index (GAV Index)
Definition: Generalised Axioms Violation Index (GAV Index)
The formula below is the GAV Index for sequence length T .
GAVT =
1
T
T∑
i=1
pi ∗ (qi − qi+1)
p′iqi
(1.3)
with qT+1 = q1 .
Similar to the MPI, an interesting interpretation of exploiting the household
irrational bundle choice is to think of the fictitious third party as a business. An
efficient “money pump” concept loosely translates to making profit from house-
holds in a business-like fashion. However, no real distinction is made between
each bundle decision; only the total surplus is considered when attempting to
profit from irrationality. Essentially, a business could act more efficiently and
achieve higher profits if it established and exploited individual surpluses, but also,
vitally, relative to each income. This is the key contribution that the GAV Index
highlights. To frame it as a hypothetical story, the fictitious third party now acts
as a business with a manager and employees. The manager overlooks the entire
process and allocates employees to each household decision. Each employee is
then responsible for analysing and extracting relative surplus from their allocated
household decision. The sum of those surpluses is then a measure of irrationality.
This extraction of these surpluses is done on a bundle-by-bundle basis, as opposed
to over the whole cycle. A household that scores a 0 is perfectly rational as there
is no hypothetical profit to be made; a GAV Index of nearly 1 suggests almost all
their income is extracted from the arbitrager.
To derive the GAV Index, it is sufficient to show the proof for 2 bundles, which
extends naturally to the T bundles case. As per the figure combined with the
description above, δ1, δ2 refer to the relative losses of income that are acceptable
to the consumer as a result of their irrational choice. This means that δ2 = p
′
1B1−
p′1B2 and δ1 = p
′
2B2 − p′2B1. If these are standardised by expenditure in their
respective current periods, and then summed, this yields GAV2=
2∑
i=1
pi∗(qi−qi+1)
pi∗qi ,
18
Figure 1.1: Each grey area represents lost income as a result of choosing a GARP
violating bundle. The δ’s measure the extent to which this income is lost in terms
of the area under the budget constraints.
where q3 = q1. The extension to T bundles is then obvious.
1.3.3.3 Statistical Test for GAV Index
As is clear from above, the standard revealed preference analyses are typically
binary in their classification for rationality i.e. a consumer is rational if they satisfy
GARP, otherwise they are irrational. The literature, including the new measure
of rationality in this chapter, addresses this by proposing measures of rationality
in order to ascertain how severely a consumer violates GARP. However, there
is still difficulty in understanding the magnitudes of any measure of rationality
insofar as it is hard to disentangle what is truly the measure of irrationality from
statistical noise. I address this by formulating a statistical test for the GAV Index.
Following Echenique et al. (2011), it is assumed that there is measurement error
(normally distributed) in the observed prices, where the standard deviation of
price discounts from coupons is equivalent to the standard error of the mean-zero
additive measurement error term, as shown below.18
Specifically, the reason for formulating a statistical test for the GAV Index
is to establish whether the calculated GAV Index is statistically large enough to
18This is approximately 1.11 cents per unit of consumption, see Echenique et al. (2011) for
further details.
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conclude an irrational decision. The null hypothesis is that of perfect rationality
and the following alternative hypothesis being that of irrationality. In order to
derive an statistical test for the GAV Index, I use a similar approach as established
by Varian (1985) for which there is an assumed measurement error in quantities
chosen. Given the data used, measurement error in prices is a much more refined
and intuitive way of deriving a statistical test for this context. The statistical
test is then applied to each decision per household that incurs a possible GARP
violation.
Let pi = Ki + µi where Ki denotes the true price. Let θi denote income shares
and assume that the i.i.d µi
θi
are normally distributed with mean 0, and variance
σ2
θ2i
. The formula for the variance of the GAV Index with sequence length T is:
T∑
i=1
1
T 2
σ2||(qi − qi+1)2|| 1
θ2i
(1.4)
with the derivation resigned to an appendix.19
For transparency, the main assumption, beyond the distributional assump-
tions is that of equal marginal utility of income across observation, for the true
prices. In essence, that the marginal change in income results in the same util-
ity change across observation. In the context of grocery shopping, this is far
from unreasonable. Recall from above, that a dataset is rationalisable if the bun-
dles chosen are consistent with utility maximisation with a linear budget con-
straint. This holds true for every time period. Under the null hypothesis of
rationality, and Afriat’s Theorem, it must be that the Afriat inequalities hold.
For simplicity, consider a dataset D = {Kt,qt}t∈{1,2}. The Afriat inequalities
are u1 − u2 ≤ λ2K2′(q1 − q2) and u2 − u1 ≤ λ1K1′(q2 − q1). This implies that
0 ≤ λ2K2′(q1−q2)+λ1K1′(q2−q1). By setting λ1 = λ2, we get the standard law
19As I am mainly concerned with the role of consideration sets and sequence length on ra-
tionality, the statistical test is not of huge concern for this particular exercise. This is because
the main comparisons will be done across rationality indices, whereas the statistical test is con-
structed to check whether rationality is violated or not. Hence, as we are concerned with how
rationality changes under different decision-making scenarios, the statistical test provides robust-
ness checks for ascertaining rationality. For the CCEI, the standard benchmark of 0.95 is used.
The statistical tests are implemented for the different scenarios and do not add (nor take-away)
from the ensuing analysis and conclusions.
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of demand derived from the Afriat inequalities i.e. (K2 −K1)′(q1 − q2) ≤ 0 with
true prices, rather than just the observed prices. Generalised to a larger dataset,
these set of equations are crucial in deriving the above formula for the variance of
the GAV Index.
1.3.3.4 Similarities and Differences between MPI and GAV Index
As is easily derived, the MPI and GAV Index are only theoretically identical
when all the denominators are equal i.e. when T · p′1q1 =
T∑
i=1
pi ∗ qi = T · p′2q2 =
... = T ·p′TqT . This means that, as long as expenditures vary across time periods,
then there is no theoretical reason that tie together the MPI and GAV Index. If
they are sufficiently close, then these rationality indices will report similar results.
Interestingly, despite the above comparison, the example below shows that the
GAV Index and MPI can offer very different conclusions, so, unless expenditure
really remains exactly the same across time period, then it is possible for these
indices to give opposing results. In a sense, the GAV Index allows for the absolute
maximum surplus to be extracted per observation, whereas the MPI seeks to do
so over the entire sequence length.
Consider a sequence length of 3 where p′1q1 = α, p
′
2q2 = α, p
′
3q3 = α + β,
p′1q2 = γ, p
′
2q3 = pi, and p
′
3q1 = α, where α ≥ γ, α ≥ pi.
GAV3 = 1− 1
3
[
γ
α
+
pi
α
+
α
α + β
]
(1.5)
MPI3 =
[
1− γ + pi + α
3α + β
]
(1.6)
When β is less than zero (but still sufficiently large), then GARP is not violated
as p′1q1 ≥ p′1q2, p′2q2 ≥ p′2q3, and p′3q3 ≤ p′3q1. In this case both MPI and the
GAV index are set to 0 indicating no GARP violation. When β is exactly equal
to zero (a mild violation of GARP), then the GAV index and MPI coincide, as
budgets are equal across all observations. However, when β is greater than zero,
β grows larger and larger, the MPI explodes to perfect irrationality whereas the
GAV index stays relatively conservative. In this example, the GAV index is not
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as punishing given that it extracts surplus per observation as opposed to the MPI
which accumulates surplus over all observations from the consumer. Even more
variability in expenditure over observations can mean the conclusions from the
GAV index and MPI can differ further.
Throughout this thesis, due to the data, as observed expenditures are very
much constant over time for almost all individuals, I report the results just for the
MPI. As shown above, the theoretical results will be similar enough to warrant
analysis of either the GAV Index or MPI. Although they are shown to be similar,
there are some cases where the GAV Index is better correlated with the CCEI than
the MPI. This can be thought of as a consequence of the GAV Index allowing for a
more efficient extraction of surplus from the agents. However, overall, the results
for the GAV Index can be analysed and evaluated in the same manner as is done
for the MPI, and therefore, do not lead to any different conclusions.
1.3.4 Theoretics of Using MPI and CCEI
In order to show robustness of the rationality indices in trying to answer the above
questions, it is important to know if there are any potential theoretical reasons as
to why the MPI or CCEI could react in a predictable way.20 By examples, it is
relatively easy to show that there are no plausible theoretical predictions.
Recall that a dataset, D = {{pt,qt}t∈E1 , ..., {pt,qt}t∈EK}, with limited consid-
eration is defined by partitioning a dataset into observations with the same consid-
eration set. Instead of doing the revealed preference analysis over the entire set of
observations, rationality indices will be calculated for each partition. For example
suppose E1 = {1, 2, 4, 5}, E2 = {3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}, and E3 = {6, 13, 14, 15}. So,
for E1, the set of goods with positive consumption were the same in periods 1,2,4,
and 5 etc... By the definition of the MPI:
20It is important to note that even if some pattern exists, this does not necessarily warrant
exclusion of a particular index, rather, it allows the analysis to be completed with even more
precision and caution.
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MPIE1 =
∑
i∈E1
pi ∗ (qi − qi+1)∑
i∈E1
pi ∗ qi
=
p1q1 + p2q2 + p4q4 + p5q5 − p1q2 − p2q4 − p4q5 − p5q1
p1q1 + p2q2 + p4q4 + p5q5
= 1− p1q2 + p2q4 + p4q5 + p5q1
p1q1 + p2q2 + p4q4 + p5q5
MPIE2 = 1−
p3q7 + p7q8 + p8q9 + p9q10 + p10q11 + p11q12 + p12q3
p3q3 + p7q7 + p8q8 + p9q9 + p10q10 + p11q11 + p12q12
MPIE3 = 1−
p6q13 + p13q14 + p14q15 + p15q6
p6q6 + p13q13 + p14q14 + p15q15
Firstly, conditional on all the consideration sets having the same number of goods,
there appears to be no natural theoretical pattern that could arise for longer/shorter
sequence lengths. In other words, even if the consideration sets used for each par-
tition have exactly the same number of goods, there are no discernible theoretical
predictions to be had in terms of sequence length.
Secondly, looking at MPIE1 and MPIE3 with the same sequence length, even
if they come from consideration sets that have a vastly different number of goods,
it is not possible to see any plausible reason for systematic differences in the
measures. From a theoretical perspective, even if E1 came from a consideration
set with 5 goods and E1 with 85 goods, there are no reasons why the calculated
MPIs should change systematically.21
Recall that the definition of the CCEI is e∗ ∈ sup(e) such that that no violations
of VGARP exist (for e ∈ [0, 1]). This implies that comparing any chain of bundles
that includes a zero-bundle will result in a CCEI of 1. This is because zero-
bundles always trivially satisfy GARP (and thus VGARP). An example would be
the following:
21A similar analysis can be done with the GAV Index, with the same conclusion.
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Going back to the simplest case, suppose there are 2 bundles, the CCEI would be
e∗ = max
{
p′1q1
p′1q2
,
p′2q2
p′2q1
}
(1.7)
Given that e ∈ [0, 1], if either q1 or q2 were zero implies that e∗ = 1. The
interpretation being that the consumer can always afford the zero bundle, at any
prices, so no income adjustment would be required to be considered rational.
Although there is a trivial satisfying of GARP, on average, a household may appear
more rational if the consideration set has any bundles that are the zero vector.
Hence, from the point of view of the CCEI, exclusion of the zero bundles should
give a more reasonable picture of rationality, as the chance for trivial satisfying of
GARP is removed.22 Again, by definition of the CCEI, an increasing/decreasing
sequence length does not have any predictable effect on the CCEI, nor should the
number of goods within consideration sets give rise to any theoretical pattern.
1.4 Data Description
1.4.1 Stanford Basket Dataset
The Stanford Basket Dataset is a a scanner panel dataset based on data from nine
major supermarkets located in a large U.S. city. There are 103,345 transactions
involving 4,082 (unique) items observed on a weekly basis per household. This
dataset23 comprises expenditure on groceries24 and demographic data25 for 494
households covering June 2001 to June 2003 (26 months). It is important to note
that analysis on individual households can be performed because of the ‘panel’
nature of the dataset.
For this particular dataset, I follow Echenique et al. (2011) by focusing on
food expenditure.26 Widely accepted in the literature, food expenditure is not
22Obviously, it is still possible to satisfy GARP and score a CCEI of 1 without zero-bundles.
23Collected by Information Resources Inc.
24Bacon, Barbecue, Butter, Cereal, Coffee, Crackers, Eggs, Ice-Cream, Nuts, Analgesics,
Pizza, Snacks, and Sugar.
25Age, Income Level, Family Size, and Education Attained
26For direct comparisons, I follow their uploaded version of the Stanford Basket Dataset.
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expected to fluctuate greatly in response to large changes in income. The main
reason for this is that many food types are considered necessities, which means
that anticipated changes in income should not reflect in any real changes to food
consumption. Excluding luxury goods should escape the issue of potential overes-
timation of irrationality. The reason for this being that even with minimal changes
to income, the consumption response for luxury goods can be volatile.27 Although
this volatility is not necessarily irrational behaviour, when measuring the extent of
the irrationality, it can potentially lead to an upward/downward bias of the CCEI,
MPI, or GAV Index making consumers seem more irrational/rational than they
are. The thirteen products selected, therefore, follow a representative consumer
basket as well as avoiding these issues related to luxury goods.28
Another issue to be addressed is that of income separability. The assumption
held is that, the items chosen form a separable group with respect to household
preferences. If this assumption did not hold, the methodology of measuring irra-
tionality using the CCEI and MPI fails as optimal bundle choices would depend on
goods external to the ones chosen. This is also true from the framework of consid-
eration sets. Without the income separability of this group, the true consideration
set may include goods outside of the representative basket which would not fa-
cilitate robust analysis. This assumption is widely accepted in related demand
literature e.g. (Blundell (1988) etc...)
Owing to the fact that GARP analysis requires sufficient price observations
and variation, any goods that did not have this requirement were dropped from
the dataset (approximately 13% of observations dropped). Note also that data
is aggregated to the monthly level as in Echenique et al. (2011) and Demuynck
and Seel (2018). Given the basket of goods studied, longer time periods would
be unnecessary given the nature of the goods and shorter time periods would not
take into account issues of storability across short time periods.
27Volatile in the sense that any marginal drops in income could result in the consumer substi-
tuting away from luxury goods.
28Spanning 375 products from which to choose.
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1.5 Results
1.5.1 Rationality Indices
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 provide some summary statistics with respect to the partition-
ing. On average, over the 26 months of data, households bought 56 different goods
(from a total of 375 distinct goods) with a fair amount of variation across house-
holds. The average number of equivalence classes was around 24.47. For a dataset
of 26 observations, this means that, on average, almost every observation is within
its own equivalence class. This is exactly true for 217 of the households that have
26 equivalence classes. For the household that has 14 equivalence classes, this
means that they had 14 different consideration sets over 26 months, where each
consideration set has a different set of goods with positive consumption. As there
are several households with many consideration sets, the proceeding results will
take into account the trivial satisfying of GARP for those that have 26 different
consideration sets over the 26 observations, as these individuals will score perfectly
in terms of rationality.
Table 1.3 gives a summary of the rationality indices for the entire dataset.
Any average or median calculated was done so for those who violated GARP. This
includes all cycle lengths from 2 up to and including 5. As a general comment,
although the frequency of GARP violations is high (around 80%), it seems as
though the magnitude of these violations is not large.29
Table 1.4 provides the same statistics but incorporating consideration sets.
The process is exactly the same as in Table 1.3, except the rationality indices are
calculated for each equivalence class i.e. for each consideration set. The statistics
in this table then show the average over all consideration sets and households.
Consider cycle length 2. Suppose a household has 4 consideration sets each with
sequence length of 6. I calculate the rationality index for all pairs of bundles for
each of the 4 consideration sets, with respective cycle length. Grouping each of the
29In fact, the MPI and GAV Index are not statistically able to reject GARP at any sensible
level of significance. The CCEI is also above 0.95, which is the standard threshold for rejecting
GARP using the CCEI.
26
calculations from each consideration set, I then compute the summary statistics.
As GARP was trivially satisfied for the vast majority of consumers with 25+
equivalence classes, these were omitted for all cycle lengths.30 Including them
would have essentially meant the summary statistics would have exhibited per-
fect rationality, albeit somewhat superficially. The table shows the statistics for
those who had between 14 and 22 consideration sets (depending on cycle length).
There are two points of interest showcased by Table 1.4. Firstly, the proportion
of households violating GARP has reduced. Secondly, across the board, the con-
sumers appear to be more rational. On the former, as there are essentially less
opportunities to fail GARP, given the shorter total sequence lengths, it is not sur-
prising that there is a drop. However, it did drop to a proportion lower than what
was expected. On the latter, of those who did violate GARP, there also appears
to be a drop in the level of irrationality. This suggests that, in the cases where
consumers do violate GARP, they are not doing so as severely. It seems to be
the case that when taking into account limited consideration, agents are in fact
more rational than originally thought, perhaps as the decision making process is
simpler than originally prescribed by the canonical model.
As rationality indices are computed for each consideration set, it is possible to
compare consideration sets with different numbers of goods. Consider a household
with 4 consideration sets each with sequence length 6. Previously, for each of the
consideration sets, I calculated the rationality indices and took summary statistics
over the aggregate. However, suppose 2 of the consideration sets had 40 goods
used, whereas the other 2 used only 10 goods. It may be more suitable to compare
consideration sets of similar sizes. The modal number of goods per consideration
set was 3, with the vast majority of consideration sets having between 2 and 18
goods. Note that any household with the specific consideration set size of the
column is included. For comparison, Table 1.5 reports summary statistics for
cycle length 2, but for consideration sets with 2-7 goods, again excluding those
with 25+ consideration sets. Table 1.6 reports the same but for consideration sets
30Clearly trivially satisfied for those with 26 equivalence classes.
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with 8-13 goods.
Interestingly, for all the rationality indices, there does appear to be an increase
in the level of irrationality as the consideration set size increases. This is in
keeping with the idea being that it might be costlier to make a rational decision
when there are more goods from which to choose. In essence, a household that has
larger consideration sets may make somewhat more irrational decisions compared
to those with smaller consideration sets. However, it is important to be cautious
as the magnitudes of the irrationalities are small, and any increase in these over
consideration set size is also fairly minimal; although the pattern clearly exists,
with these data, the effect is unsubstantial.31
Average sequence length is defined as the average of the average sequence
length for a consumer with any consideration set of a specific size. In terms of
sequence length, it is not hugely surprising that it is decreasing with consideration
set size. As the consideration set size increases, there is an increased chance that
these consideration sets belong only to their own equivalence class. As the dataset
becomes more partitioned, this means the average sequence length decreases which
is what happens as the consideration set size increases. This seems to be offset
by the fact that there are many combinations of goods which lead to specific
consideration set size. For example, there are many different consideration sets
that can have just 2 goods. Overall, this seems to be a modest decrease.32
Tables 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9 segment the data both by consideration set size and
sequence length.33 Table 1.7 simply corroborates that there are many considera-
tion sets that are in their own equivalence class i.e. they are unique to their time
period. As per the previous tables, Tables 1.8 and 1.9 also show similar patterns
across consideration set size do seem to occur, with a slight increase in the level
of irrationality. Additionally, there do appear to be some overall decreases in ra-
tionality for longer sequence lengths. These suggest that as the decision-making
31Based on the statistical tests from the MPI and the GAV index, it is not possible to reject
GARP at any sensible significance level.
32More generally, it may simply be a consequence of the strict definition of a consideration
set.
33Any household with that specific sequence length and consideration set size is included.
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process becomes more difficult, whether it be from a larger consideration set or a
longer sequence length, then there is a greater likelihood of being more irrational.
As with with the previous results the magnitudes of these patterns are modest,
however, they are definitely present.
1.5.2 Demographics
Tables 7 reports a set of regressions of the CCEI on a selection of demographic
variables from the Stanford Basket Dataset.34 The demographic data collected
were dummy variables for age35, income36, family size37, and education38. Addi-
tionally, Table 7 shows regressions that also control for average consideration set
size (ACSS), and average sequence length (ASL).39
From Table 7, education is not a statistically significant determinant of ratio-
nality. Intuitively, education levels should improve the decision-making process
and hence lead to the observation of higher rationality. Although this effect is
captured by the negativity of these coefficients, these are not statistically signifi-
cant at the 10% significance level. In terms of the age dummies, it appears that
only MidAge is statistically significant whereas OldAge is not. On one hand, this
result could make intuitive sense as it would not be unfair to say that younger
individuals are able to access information more efficiently than their older coun-
terparts. As such, being younger could be an important factor in determining
rationality. On the other hand, age could signify experience which should lead to
more rational decisions. A potential explanation as to why this is not seen in the
tables is that rationality is an inherent characteristic; rationality could be seen as
a quality that is determined by an inherent ability and availability of resources.
The way in which decisions can also be influenced by their environment. This
can be seen though the family size variables. Familial decisions, especially related
34Households with missing demographics were omitted from the regressions.
35OldAge >65, MidAge ∈ [30,65]
36HighIncome > $45000, MidIncome ∈ [$20000,$45000]
37LargeFamily > 4, MidFamily ∈ [3,4]
38High School, College; Average education across partners.
39The purpose of the regressions is to easily tabulate conditional correlations with the covari-
ates and rationality. Causal effects would be impossible to argue in this context.
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to basics such as food, could be regarded as an extremely important part of the
decision-making process. This could be because it forms a large separable group
as well as the fact that there may be a very direct and clear desire to avoid wasting
income on superfluous food expenditure. In both tables, negative and significant
coefficients on the family size variables support this argument. Although, as more
factors are involved, the above argument may only be true for the larger families.
In terms of income variables, being a middle-income household is more likely to
affect rationality than a high-income household. Relating back to the argument of
not wanting to waste income, this makes intuitive sense as high-income households
are more likely to make seemingly irrational behaviour when it comes to their
necessity goods. Relative to their higher income, there is more scope for wasted
income for a basket of necessity goods. As middle-income households may have
to be more cautious when it comes to their necessities expenditure, they are less
willing to waste any of their income through irrational choices; again, this idea is
supported by negative and significant coefficients on MidIncome in both tables.40
When controlling for ASL, there do not appear to be any noticeable changes
in the other coefficients, and all covariates that were previously significant have
stayed so. ASL itself is statistically significant at the 1% level with negative
coefficient, suggesting that consumers that have longer (average) sequence lengths
tend to make slightly more irrational decisions. However, when also controlling
for ACSS, the statistical significance of ASL is lost suggesting that it is ACSS
that is a more relevant in explaining (ir)rationality. Again, as the coefficient is
negative, this seems to corroborate with the story that agents that have larger
consideration sets may be more likely to make mistakes in their bundle choices, as
it is more difficult to make decisions from a larger set of goods. In comparison to
the demographic variables, it seems as though the coefficient ACSS is in the same
order of magnitude as the other main covariates suggesting it can play a large role
in the measurement of rationality.
40It could be argued that the representative basket for richer households should include luxuries
in order to form a proper income separable group.
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1.6 Implications
1.6.1 Application & Policy Implications
An important issue that has arisen from all the previous analysis pertains to
whether households are consciously aware of the role of consideration sets. This
is most likely the case when it comes to the most obvious examples that come
from the marketing literature. However, in all likeliness, consumers are using
consideration sets in a far more general setting, as suggested by the previous
results. Potentially, if more households were aware of this decision-making process,
they would be less likely to waste income or be exploited in terms of making
rational decisions. This has hugely important implications on research in general
where the assumption of completeness is presumed with little additional thought.
In fact, from the literature on consideration sets and the results in this chapter,
avoiding this issue can lead to misleading and inaccurate conclusions. Although
the issue of rationality may seem small in magnitude, this is countered by the fact
that even the smallest magnitudes are amplified by population. Overall, there is
large potential for more rational decision-making to be made if consumer are more
aware of techniques that improve their decision-making process. In this particular
scenario of bundle choices, use of consideration sets seems to be one of the most
clearcut ways of simplifying decision-making in order to make better choices.
Another related policy issue comes from the simulated dataset analysis. The
data imply that the irrational decisions lead to a low scoring rationality (by defi-
nition), the natural reverse argument being that those with lower rationality are
more susceptible to irrational decisions in other settings. This suggests policy
should target those who are regarded as making frequent and/or large irrational
decisions. The potential reasons for this are many such as unavailability of re-
sources (both in monetary terms and informational), lack of awareness in relation
to other consumers and firms (asymmetric information argument) etc... In essence,
policy needs to take into account that there are households that are not as ratio-
nal as others which leads to irrational decisions, which feeds through adversely
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through the economy as wasted and exploited income; the positive impact that
any policy may have will be dampened if decision-making processes and rationality
are not examined properly.
As demonstrated by the regressions, it is not just the intrinsic characteristics of
the household that matter but also the more ‘human’ and ‘situational’ factors i.e.
demographic factors that more accurately describe their ‘actual’ living situation. It
is true to say that variables on income, age, education etc... are all of importance
when it comes to explaining rationality. However, ‘how’ a household lives may
also be extremely important when looking at choice data. A stark example could
be comparing two modest-income households with several young children, one
with family members geographically nearby to help with the daily routine, and a
family without. It could be argued that the household with help from additional
family members has more time to gain information to improve their decision-
making and thus would score higher according to a rationality index. However, in
relative terms, this distinction would not have been made by the use of standard
demographic variables. The regressions also seem to show that more difficult
decisions tend to be more irrational than others, as suggested by the negative
relationship between average consideration set size and rationality. The argument
being that there is an intrinsic household ability/rationality that is biased upwards
or downwards depending on ‘living’ factors. These kind of factors should be taken
into account when it comes to analysis related to choice data, revealed preference
or consideration sets.
1.7 Extensions & Limitations
A well known empirical feature of revealed preference analysis is that there tends to
be few violations of GARP, this gives rise to the ‘low power’ of GARP. Andreoni
et. al (2011) explain in detail many ‘power measures’ and ‘power indices’ that
attempt to measure the power of GARP for a given dataset. The concept behind
power measures is the measuring of the ex-ante probability of rejecting the null
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hypothesis of rationality when false. Power indices measure by how much the data
generating process, ex-post, needs to be stimulated in order to induce a rationality
violation. However, when dealing with power measures, there is flexibility in
the definition of the null hypothesis and even more so in how the alternative
hypothesis is constructed. This chapter sought to analyse rationality combined
with consideration sets and used a simulated dataset as an alternative way of
dealing with the potential issue of low power, rather than using power measures
for robustness.
Note that choosing the ‘most accurate’ power measure or power index is some-
what subjective and the choice may change depending on purpose and type of data
available. For example, experimental datasets may have given prices and income
to subjects and then asked for their choices, therefore, the price and income vari-
ability is an issue that has to be taken into consideration when choosing a power
measure. Another example would be the use of cross-sectional data which typi-
cally exhibit higher income variability which may require a more sensitive power
measure (typically, datasets with high income variability tend to not find many
GARP violations). However, generally speaking, rationality indices tend to have
good power in their ability to reject/not reject rationality. Hence, by simulating
an environment similar to the dataset used, this leads to a more robust check of
the power of revealed preferences in this particular setting.
Another potential extension would be to modify the typical analysis related to
existing rationality indices to directly take into account the use of zero-bundles.
The analysis done by Echenique et. al (2011) involved only analysing decisions
that were deemed irrational, as such, their calculations on averages did not include
any completely rational decisions41; this may lead to an interpretation that under-
estimates consumer rationality. Perhaps an alternative method would have been
to take a weighted average over the CCEIs/MPIs instead of a simple arithmetic
mean or omitting the completely rational decisions. For example, some form of
down-weighting on the purely rational decisions as a function of the number of ra-
41Averages were done without those who scored perfectly rational according to the CCEI and
MPI.
33
tional decisions. On average, this should not change the direction of analysis, but
may give more meaningful (and perhaps accurate) interpretation to the rationality
indices.
Briefly mentioned previously, the issue of how particular goods were aggregated
potentially meant that analysis and conclusions drawn were not as specific as they
could have been. The publicly available version of this dataset aggregated some
of the goods in a precise way. Specifically, the available data aggregated distinct
goods of particular brands across different sizes. The aggregation was done across
the different sizes of each distinct product for which an average price (according
to size) was calculated.42 Although this type of aggregation is not a significant
issue, with access to the more raw data, it would have been interesting to see
how rationality changed when including or excluding certain brands of particular
products (in a similar vein to Chiang et. al (1999) with different ketchup brands).
1.8 Concluding remarks
The objective of this chapter was to present analysis that combines the role of con-
sideration sets with economic rationality in the decision-making process. Using a
scanner panel dataset and a simulated dataset, and applying three separate mea-
sures of rationality, there is evidence to suggest a heuristic such as consideration
set formation is able to help consumers make more rational decisions. The role of
consideration sets is reflected through increasingly irrational consumption choices
exacerbated by the ‘average size’ of the consideration set; in a sense, suggesting
that consumers are better at making rational decisions in less complex environ-
ments, and thus can be more rational overall. Additionally, there is evidence to
suggest that demographic factors play some role in explaining why certain individ-
uals are more likely to make more irrational decisions than others, controlling for
variables that are related to consideration set formation. Overall, through the lens
of economic rationality, the role of consideration sets can be as a useful heuristic
42e.g. Averaging over the different Evian water bottle sizes to get an ‘average Evian water
product’ priced at the weighted average of the prices of the different bottle sizes.
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to benefit consumers by enhancing their decision-making process.
In conclusion, there is a clear relationship between the role of consideration
sets and revealed preference theory (vis-a`-vis rationality) in the decision-making
process of the household. In this chapter, I hope to have provided an initial insight
into how these concepts can be combined and how that this can improve our ability
to study economic behaviour.
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Chapter 2
Cost of Consideration and
Revealed Preference
2.1 Introduction
1 Commonly seen in the marketing and management sciences literature, ini-
tially proposed by Wright and Barbour (1977) a consideration set is seen to be
a subset of the total number of goods with which the consumer makes a choice.
Similar to the description given in Horowitz and Louviere (1995), the set of goods
that the consumer uses to make their decision “need not coincide with the set of all
possible alternatives”. In this chapter, I explore a consideration set incorporated
revealed preference approach to try determine the cost of consideration.
Since the seminal work of Afriat (1967), the Generalised Axiom of Revealed
Preference (GARP) has been used as a way of determining consumer rational
behaviour from micro-datasets. Afriat (1967) elegantly proves how GARP can
provide us with necessary and sufficient conditions on bundle choices that are
consistent with economic rationality. This can boil down to verifying whether the
“Afriat Inequalities” hold for a finite dataset. Diewert (1973) provides an easily
implementable linear program which yields, as solutions, the Afriat Inequalities.
1For this specific chapter, I would like to thank Richard Blundell, Syngjoo Choi, Laurens
Cherchye, Bram De Rock, and Frederick Vermeulen for invaluable discussions and comments. I
am grateful for financial support from ECR Grant 509157.
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If the inequalities are satisfied, the consumer is said to have a utility function that
rationalises their behaviour.
What this chapter hopes to highlight is that revealed preference analysis should
somehow incorporate the use of consideration sets in the decision-making process.
It is well known that consumers must narrow down their set of chosen goods due
to some form of cognitive constraint. This is, by no means, a slight on consumers
(or even their rationality), rather, it is a way of trying to incorporate more accu-
rate behavioural assumptions into a relatively parsimonious model of consumers.
This suggests that observed data may not be consistent with rationality. Given
the strict standard economics definition of perfect consumer behaviour, it may be
no surprise that consumers do not always appear as standard utility maximisers. I
directly attempt to model and estimate this cost associated with consideration in a
way that assumes as little as possible whilst still allowing rejections of (bounded)
rationality. In principle, I can derive a cost of consideration per good and can
be heterogenous across consumers. Mehta et al. (2003) answer a similar question
in the sense that they try to establish the cost of consideration using a struc-
tural model for laundry detergents through uncertainty in quality of the goods.
However, this chapter differs by addressing this issue through revealed preferences
without making any distributional assumptions on consideration costs.
The chapter is structured in the following way: Section 2.2 provides a brief
outline of the literature as well as a technical overview of revealed preferences.
Section 2.3 presents a standard utility maximisation model that incorporates lim-
ited consideration, with estimation procedure. Section 2.4 provides the results
after applying the model to a scanner dataset. Section 2.5 concludes.2
2In the appendix, I briefly mention the issue of dimensionality when it comes to analysing
consideration sets in a revealed preference approach.
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2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Consideration Sets
Amongst the economics literature, Spiegler and Eliaz (2011), Manzini and
Mariotti (2014), Masatlioglu et al. (2012), Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2013), De-
muynck and Seel (2018) are the most prevalent papers.
Spiegler and Eliaz (2011) apply economic theory to the original application of
consideration sets, within a framework of marketing and competition. Their idea
behind the construction of the consideration set is via the consumer’s unawareness
of certain products. Some form of marketing strategy is then introduced to con-
sumers in order to alter their consideration set. They devise a model that seeks
to encapsulate a means for firms to somehow extract surplus from consumers as a
result of asymmetric information from the use of consideration sets. Masatlioglu
and Nakajima (2013) design a framework that studies a more general framework
of consumers who use consideration sets in their decision-making process. The
consideration set is formed as a function of an exogenous and feasible ‘starting
point’ (F ). Let C1(F (0), Y ) ⊆ Y where Y represents budget feasibility. The
consumer makes choices based on C(F, Y ) with a binary relation operator on the
complete set of alternatives, A. If the consumer gets (at least) their starting point
option, the decision-making process is complete, if not, the consumer constructs a
‘smaller’ consideration set where the new starting point is the previously rejected
alternative i.e. C2(F (1), Y ), where F (1) is the alternative that was rejected in the
previous period; the process is then iterated. Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2013)
also propose a more realistic version of their iterative model in that the initial
starting point is inferred from the choice data.3
Manzini and Mariotti (2014) specifically model a boundedly rational consumer
whereby agents have a probability distribution over alternatives. They attempt
to infer the preference ordering from consumer choices under the notion that the
3Spiegler and Eliaz (2011) can be seen as a special case of Masatlioglu & Nakajima (2012)
where the initial marketing device and initial alternative form the basis of the first consideration
set. The next stages of consideration set formation are then as a result of marketing.
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choices were generated by a consideration set where the consideration set is a
function of the larger set of alternatives. Manzini and Mariotti (2014) put forward
a model that suggests the formation of consideration sets is random in the sense
that all (feasible) alternatives have a probability of being in the consideration set;
they call this the ‘attention parameter’.4 Their decision-making procedure involves
a decision-maker with a consideration set with a complete preference relation over
that consideration set.
Demuynck and Seel (2018) depart from the economic literature in that the
analysis is done from a revealed preference point of view; the most basic difference
being that choices a´ la Afriat are continuous (over a set of discrete goods). They
provide a new axiom of revealed preference, namely the Limited Axiom of Revealed
Preference (LARP). LARP involves verifying that GARP holds within partitions
of a dataset admitted by the same consideration sets. This allows an extension to
Afriat’s Theorem under limited consideration where goods that are not admitted
by a particular consideration set are incorporated via unobserved subjective prices.
Consideration set formation is then modelled via the beliefs put on those subjective
prices. Applied to a scanner dataset from the Denver area (USA), they largely fail
to reject the use of consideration sets in the consumers decision-making process.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the only paper that incorporates standard
revealed preference analysis with consideration sets.
As Demuynck and Seel (2018) is closest to this chapter, I specifically highlight
the differences in concept. In Demuynck and Seel (2018), they initially model a
consumer with a fixed consideration set. For the goods within this consideration
set, the marginal utilities are as in the standard case. However, goods beyond
the consideration set can have marginal utilities that are larger or smaller than
those goods within the consideration set. The consideration set formation can
be endogenised with different ways of thinking about how those marginal utilities
differ from the standard case with the notion of subjective prices e.g. use of
average price, previous correct price etc... This is distinctive from the model
4In the limited attention sense.
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presented below as the marginal utilities are always (weakly) higher than the
standard case. As will be seen, this is due to this fixed cost of consideration. The
main distinction is that this chapter thinks of there always being a fixed cost of
consideration whereas Demuynck and Seel (2018) only model goods not being in
the consideration set with subjective prices.5
2.2.2 Revealed Preferences
This subsection familiarises the reader with the conventions of revealed preference.
Let T denote time periods such that T = {1, 2, ..., T}
Let pt ∈ Rn++ denote prices in period t ∈ T
Let qt ∈ Rn+ denote quantities in period t ∈ T
where n denotes the total number of available goods.
Define a finite dataset, D, as a collection of all prices and quantities i.e. D =
{pt,qt}t∈T. This dataset is a collection of observed consumption behaviour, qt,
for a consumer facing prices, pt, at observation, t.
A dataset D = {pt,qt}t∈T is rationalisable if there exists a utility function
u : Rn → R and for all observations t ∈ T, there exists a weakly positive income
level yt such that:
qt ∈ argmaxu(q)
q
subject to p′tq ≤ yt
This says that a dataset is rationalisable if the bundles, {qt}t∈T, are consistent
with utility maximisation with a linear budget constraint.
A bundle qi is directly revealed preferred to qj if p
′
iqi ≥ p′iqj. In words, the
bundle qi was at least as affordable as bundle qj at observation i. Let R denote
the directly revealed preferred binary relation i.e. qi is directly revealed preferred
to qj if qiRqj.
A bundle qi is strictly directly revealed preferred to qj if p
′
iqi > p
′
iqj. In
5In fact, one of the notions of subjective price is that the price cannot be “too far away” from
the true price. So the notion of a distorted price could be incorporated as a special case, if the
cost of consideration only exists for goods outside the consideration set.
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words, the bundle qi was costlier than bundle qj at observation i. Let RS denote
the strictly directly revealed preferred binary relation i.e. qi is strictly directly
revealed preferred to qj if qiRSqj.
A bundle qi is indirectly revealed preferred to qj if there exists a sequence of
observations x, y, ..., z in T such that qiRqx,qxRqy, ...,qzRqj. Let P denote the
indirectly revealed preferred binary relation i.e. qi is indirectly revealed preferred
to qj if qiPqj.
6 The number of bundles in a chain of directly revealed preferred
bundles is called the sequence length.7
The Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) is satisfied by D =
{pt,qt}t∈T, if, for all qiPqj, then it cannot be that qjRSqi; if qi is indirectly
preferred to qj, it cannot be the case that qj was purchased even when qi is
cheaper.
The seminal contribution of Afriat (1967) showed that GARP is both necessary
and sufficient for a dataset to be rationalisable.8 Given a dataset D = {pt,qt}t∈T
the following statements are equivalent:
(i) D is rationalisable by a locally non-satiated utility function
(ii) D satisfies GARP
(iii) For all observations t ∈ T, there exists ut, λ ∈ R and ut, λt ∈ R++ such that
for all pairs of observations i, j ∈ T
ui − uj ≤ λjpj′(qi − qj)
(iv) D is rationalisable by a strictly monotone and concave utility function.
where the inequalities of (iii) are called the Afriat inequalities. A neat interpreta-
tion of these come from the first order conditions of a constrained maximisation
problem using KKT conditions, where λt is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget
constraint at observation t (assuming differentiability and concavity).
6The indirectly revealed preferred binary relation is the transitive closure of R. It is the binary
relation that is transitive and minimal with respect to the set it is on.
7For example, qaRqb,qbRqc,qcRqd has a sequence length of 4.
8See Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973), Varian (1982b), Fostel et al. (2003) for detailed proofs of
Afriat’s Theorem.
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Following Demuynck and Seel (2018), suppose a consumer has access to n total
number of goods i.e. she chooses a consumption bundle qt from a set of goods
G = {1, ..., n}. If the consumer does not necessarily take into account all n goods
when purchasing, the consumer is said to have used a consideration set It ⊆ G.
This means that consumption of any goods that lie outside of her consideration
set must be equal to zero (but does not exclude the option that goods within the
consideration set are also zero).
This leads to a natural definition of rationalisability with a consideration set.
A dataset D = {pt,qt}t∈T is rationalisable with consideration set if there exists a
utility function u : Rn → R and for all observations t ∈ T, there exists a weakly
positive income level yt and consideration set It ⊆ G such that:
qt ∈ argmaxu(q)
q
subject to p′tq ≤ yt,
qi = 0 for all i 6∈ It
This says that a dataset is rationalisable if the bundles, {qt}t∈T, are con-
sistent with utility maximisation with a linear budget constraint and additional
constraints where the consumption of the ith good in qt is zero.
2.3 Theoretical Framework
2.3.1 Model
In order to incorporate a consideration set cost into the standard utility maximi-
sation process widely studied in economics, I present a simple modification that
involves consumers maximising their utility, subject to, what is essentially, a spe-
cific non-linear budget constraint. For every time period, all consumers solve the
following optimisation problem9:
max
q
U(q) (2.1)
9I include the period subscript only when necessary for complete clarification.
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subject to
p′q + c(q) ≤ y (2.2)
Clearly, the choice of c(q) is important in determining the process in which con-
sideration sets affect the bundle choice. If c(q) is 0 for all q, then the standard
practice holds. This is non-trivial and is discussed in much further detail below.
In particular, how this cost function will incorporate a cost of consideration.
In keeping with the notion of consideration sets, an “ideal” optimisation prob-
lem would be as follows:
max
q
U(q) (2.3)
subject to
p′q ≤ y (2.4)
c(q) ≤ F (2.5)
where equation (2.5) is some form of cognitive constraint arising from the use
of consideration sets. If the cost of consideration is strictly less than the “stock
of cognition”, then the consumer is not constrained by consideration and the
optimisation reverts to standard theory. However, there are many issues associated
with this modification despite the clarity of the concept. What restrictions should
one put on c(q)? How does one measure F? What interpretation does F hold? Is
this decision completely separable from income?
Firstly, to address the issue of interpretability, I use an idea from the revealed
preference theory literature which relates the notion of irrationality with (what is
essentially) a loss of income. As was seen in the previous chapter, there are many
indices that seek to measure irrationality as forms of wasting income. In essence,
buying affordable bundles that were previously not chosen can be rationalised if
one supposes the consumer has behaved as if they had less income. With this
in mind, the cost of consideration can be thought of as being linked to a mone-
tary value. Suppose we solve the above “ideal” optimisation problem, we get the
following lagrangian:
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L = u(q)− λ1
[
p′q− y]− λ2 [c(q)− F ]
Making use of the arbitrariness of the scale of the cognitive constraint leads to:
L = u(q)− λ1
[
p′q− y]− λ1λ2
λ1
[
c(q)− F ]
= u(q)− λ1
[
p′q− y]− λ1 [λ2
λ1
c(q)− λ2
λ1
F
]
= u(q)− λ1
[
p′q− y]− λ1 [λ2
λ1
c(q)− F˜
]
= u(q)− λ1
[
p′q +
λ2
λ1
c(q)− y − F˜
]
= u(q)− λ1
[
p˜′q + c˜(q)− 1]
where income and prices have been normalised.10
Thus, when it is binding, it is possible to transform the cognitive constraint
such that it is incorporated into the standard budget constraint giving it an in-
terpretation that is directly related to (a proportion of) expenditure. If it is not
binding, then the standard case holds. In fact, in what will follow, it can be seen
as a price distortion. In effect, in order to rationalise consumer behaviour, it is as
if consumers make bundle choices that are consistent with higher prices.
Secondly, what kind of restriction on behaviour should the constraint repre-
sent? Specifically, what could be the functional form of the constraint? Concep-
tually, the following cognitive constraint is appealing from an intuitive point of
view:
a11[q
1 > 0] + ...+ an1[q
n > 0] ≤ F (2.6)
which says that there is some fixed cognitive cost associated with a positive pur-
chase of any qi good (the ith good in vector q). If the cost of additional goods
in the consideration set is too high, then a subset of the goods will have zero
consumption, due to the cap on cognition. This is not trivial as a consumer is
10In essence, by scaling the cognitive constraint such that the shadow price of cognition is the
same as the marginal utility of income.
44
potentially faced with 1000s upon 1000s of potential goods that they can buy and
so there must be some limit as to how many they can consider. What equation
(2.6) also highlights is that there is a one-off cost associated with introducing a
good into the consideration set. In other words, for any positive purchase, there is
a consideration cost. Intuitively, this cost should not be increasing in the amount
purchased; the cost of consideration takes into account the price difference required
to be paid to bring a good into the set of considered goods. Simply, it is costly to
evaluate every single possible alternative due to limited cognition. Consider the
following basic example:
max
q1,q2∈R
U(q1, q2) (2.7)
subject to
p1q1 + p2q2 ≤ y (2.8)
a11[q1 > 0] + a21[q2 > 0] ≤ F (2.9)
Without equation 2.9, if the optimal q1, q2 are positive and a1 + a2 < F , then
this is an agent who is not cognitively constrained by their choices of the two
goods.11 However, if a1 > J > a2, then it becomes optimal to set q1 = 0 and
only consume q2 with positive amount. It is as if the agent has to pay too much
attention to the 1st good, so much so, that it is not worth doing so; the cost of
considering the 1st good is too high. This exemplifies the literature’s view on
consideration sets insofar as it is not possible to consider all possible alternatives
as there is some cost of doing so. In the example above, the cost of considering
each good is a1 and a2, and if these costs are too high, then it is possible for the
consumer not to consider those good/s, even if physically affordable.
Consider a basic example of choosing from different yoghurts (brands, flavours,
etc...). It is not reasonable (nor feasible) to believe that a consumer is willing to
make a choice from every single possible combination of yoghurts. The consumer
11This form of constraint is also seen in machine learning and econometrics, namely Lasso
regression.
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uses some heuristic or previous knowledge to eliminate certain brands from their
choice set in order to make their decision-making process easier. In this sense,
there is a cost for investigating the numerous different alternatives, and at some
point, it does not make sense to consider some alternatives, hence a consideration
set arises. What is essential here is that the cost of considering an alternative is a
simple fixed cost for any positive purchase of a good. Once a good is considered,
the cost of doing so is essentially sunk and does not pose further constraint once
a good is chosen with positive consumption.
Penultimately, given the specific function above for the constraint, and the
combining of constraints, I propose the following consideration set constraint,
allowing the function to be differentiable.
p′q + β1 tan−1[(q1 + 1)f − 1] + ...+ βn tan−1[(qn + 1)f − 1] ≤ y (2.10)
p′q + β′ tan−1[(q + 1)f − 1] ≤ y (2.11)
At first glance, the above equation looks arbitrary in the use of trigonometry.
However, in order to replicate the step-wise nature of equation (2.6), the asymp-
totes of the inverse tan function are abused, as such, the value of f determines
the speed at which the function approaches its asymptote. Note that as f tends
to infinity, that the trigonometric part of the constraint replicates equation (2.6).
The below figures explains these points graphically. Thus, by using this function,
I am able to keep differentiability whilst incorporating a cost function which is
step-wise in nature.
As mentioned in section 2.2.2, Demuynck and Seel (2018) provide a parsimo-
nious definition of rationalisability with limited consideration. In keeping with
this, I incorporate the constraint on consideration in order to identify and esti-
mate a cost of consideration. Consider the following definition of rationalisability
with consideration set costs:
A dataset D = {pt,qt}t∈T is fully rationalisable with complete consideration
set costs if there exists a concave utility function u : Rn → R, and cost function
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Figure 2.1: When f is large, the function is virtually step-wise.
c : Rn → R and for all observations t ∈ T, there exists a weakly positive income
level yt and consideration set It ⊆ G such that:
qt ∈ argmaxu(q)
q
subject to p′tq + c(q) ≤ yt,
qi = 0 for all i 6∈ It
c(q) =
∑
i∈It
βi1[qi > 0]
Now consider the set of goods with strictly positive consumption Jt, where
clearly Jt ⊆ It meaning that there can some goods that are considered but rationed
to zero. Given the above definition of rationalisability with consideration set
costs, it is not possible to identify the cost of consideration for goods that have
zero consumption, as any value of β would be rationalisable for goods with zero
consumption. Hence, the focus must be on goods with positive consumption. This
leads to the following definition and lemma:
A dataset D = {pt,qt}t∈T is rationalisable with consideration set costs if there
exists a concave utility function u : Rn → R, and cost function c : Rn → R and
for all observations t ∈ T, there exists a weakly positive income level yt and set of
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goods Jt ⊆ G such that:
qt ∈ argmaxu(q)
q
subject to p′tq + c(q) ≤ yt,
qi = 0 for all i 6∈ Jt
c(q) =
∑
i∈Jt
βi1[qi > 0]
Thus, it is possible to derive costs for goods for which there is positive con-
sumption and so the set of goods with positive consumption can be thought of as
the consideration set. In the spirit of Lemma 1 of Demuynck and Seel (2018), the
equivalent lemma holds for rationalisability with consideration set costs:
Lemma 0.1. A dataset D = {pt,qt}t∈T is fully rationalisable with complete con-
sideration set costs if it is fully rationalisable using the consideration set It = Jt.
Proof. Recall that Jt ⊆ It and qj = 0 for all j 6∈ Jt. In particular, this means
that qj = 0 for all j ∈ It \ Jt i.e. there are goods in the consideration set that
can have zero consumption. This is exactly equivalent to being fully rationalisable
with consideration set costs when the consideration set is Jt.
12
The implication of this lemma is that it is possible to think of the consideration
set as the set of goods with positive consumption. However, this lemma also means
that it limits the estimation of the cost of consideration to those goods with
positive consumption. In essence, it is not possible to identify whether someone
really considered a good and rationed it to zero consumption, or whether their
cost of consideration was too high for it to be considered. Therefore, the cost of
consideration in this setting is the cost associated with the goods purchased with
positive consumption.
Given the concavity of the utility function and the first order conditions from
the utility maximisation process, the following Afriat-style inequalities are derived
for every time period combination:
12Consider a simple case of It = {1, 2, 3, 4} and Jt = {1, 2}. As these sets are always finite,
the proof holds without loss of generality.
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u(qj) ≤ u(qi) + u′(qi) ∗ (qj − qi) (2.12)
u(qj) ≤ u(qi) + λ
(
p′ + β ′
f ∗ (qi + 1)f−1
1 + ((qi + 1)f − 1)2
)
∗ (qj − qi) (2.13)
It is important to note that this is a non-convex optimisation problem. This
means that it is not possible to guarantee (without stricter assumptions), that
this problem has a maximiser. However, as it stands, the above system only
provides sufficient conditions for a solution. The following subsection discuss the
convexification of this problem which will lead to a theorem that guarantees that
the system will have an optimal solution and that the above system will provide
the necessary and sufficient conditions required for rationality in the sense of utility
maximisation.
2.3.2 Convex Optimisation
As described above, there are certain properties of the CSC that are appealing from
a behavioural point of view. However, the issue is that non-convex optimisation is
considered non-trivial and does not have a guarantee for optimality. One method
to overcome this is issue is to ‘convexify’ the problem whilst maintaining the main
qualities of the original problem. Recall that the current problem is:
max
q
U(q) (2.14)
subject to
p′q + c(q) ≤ y (2.15)
where p′q + c(q) ≤ y is concave given the current choice of c(q) being concave.
Hence, this is a non-convex problem. With parameterisation of the function given
by θ, the following desirable properties of c(q; θ) are:
• c(q; θ) convex
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• c(0; θ) ≈ 0
• c(; θ) ≈ 1, for  sufficiently small
• c′(q; θ) ≈ 0
I propose the following as a cost function that encompasses the above restrictions:
c(q; θ1, θ2, θ3) =
[
θ1tan
−1
(
1
q − θ2
)]θ3
+ 1 (2.16)
for θ2 sufficiently small, and θ3 sufficiently large (and odd). For q > θ2, c(q; θ1, θ2, θ3)
is convex and θ1 is set to
2
pi
so that the asymptote of c(q; θ1, θ2, θ3) is 1. The cost
function is normalised to 1 so that coefficient on the cost function (β) is easily
interpretable as a direct price distortion.
θ2 ϵ 1 2 3
1
Figure 2.2: c(q; θ1, θ2, θ3) with high θ2 and low θ3.
θ2 ϵ 1 2 3
1
Figure 2.3: With lower θ2 and higher θ3, c(q; θ1, θ2, θ3) achieves the desirable prop-
erties as described above.
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Hence, the convexified utility maximisation problem now involves maximising a
standard concave utility function subject to a consideration set constraint(s) that
takes the form of:
p′q + β′
[
θ1tan
−1
(
1
q− θ2
)]θ3
+ 1 ≤ y (2.17)
q 6= θ2 (2.18)
Given the convexity of c(q; θ1, θ2, θ3), I can now proof Theorem 1, which provides
necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality for the previously given consumer
maximisation problem.
Theorem 1. A given dataset, D = {pt,qt}t∈T, is said to be consistent with the
rationalisable model of consideration set costs if and only if there exist numbers
ui ∈ R, λi ∈ R++, and βi ∈ R, for all i ∈T, such that:
uj ≤ ui + λi
[
p′i + β
′
ic
′(qi)
] ∗ (qj − qi) (2.19)
βi ≤ pi (2.20)
q 6= θ2 (2.21)
where c′(q) is given by:
− θ3θ1θ3
tan−1
 1q− θ2


θ3−1
1 +
 1q− θ2

2
 [q− θ2]2
(2.22)
Theorem 1 provides a parsimonious way of estimating consideration set costs
with familiar Afriat inequalities. For goods with positive consumption, it is pos-
sible to estimate the cost of consideration which is consistent with the aforemen-
tioned rationalisable model of consideration set costs, where the consideration set
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is the set of goods with positive consumption. If there is cost of consideration,
then it is as if the consumer chooses their bundle with a distorted price which is
higher than the observed price; this is the source of irrationality that the model
implies. If the agent does not have a cost of consideration, then they are rational
and their β vector is zero.
It is important to note that there are specific restrictions on the β vector. In a
sense, the costs of consideration can provide a range on how irrational a consumer
can be. Without putting additional restrictions on the cost of consideration, it
would always be possible to rationalise all behaviour as allowing consideration sets
to grow arbitrarily large ensures the Afriat inequalities hold in the correct direc-
tion. In some sense, by putting these additional restrictions in place, it is possible
to classify agents as completely rational, partially irrational, and completely irra-
tional, where being completely irrational is an agent whose choices cannot be made
consistent with the model of consideration set costs. This is discussed further in
the estimation and implementation sections.
2.3.3 Estimation
Given a dataset of prices and bundle choices, for each individual, the solution to
the following linear program13 gives estimates for utility levels (ut), the marginal
utility of income (λ), and the costs of consideration (β).
min S (2.23)
subject to
uj = ui + λi
[
p′i + β
′
ic
′(q)
] ∗ (qj − qi)− Sij + S14 (2.24)
S, Sij > 0 (2.25)
q > θ2 (2.26)
13The main idea for the linear program comes directly from Fleissig and Whitney (2005)
14If S = 0 and Sij ≥ 0, the inequalities hold in the correct direction. However, if S > 0, this is
a definite violation of rationality as the inequality, for sure, will not hold in the correct direction.
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βi ≤ pi (2.27)
λi ≥ 1 (2.28)
where c′(q) is given by:
− θ3θ1θ3
tan−1
 1x+ θ2


θ3−1
1 +
 1q + θ2

2
 [q + θ2]2
(2.29)
Hence, this is a linear programming problem with (T + 1)2 + n ∗ T variables.
For the system above, it is only relative utility is what is identified by the
program, in the sense that it would be possible to set ut to an arbitrary constant
and all other utility levels would adjust. Also, the constraint on λ ≥ 1 is required
as linear systems require weak inequalities to work, however, the KKT-conditions
would require λ > 0. Given that the Afriat inequalities with consideration are still
homogenous in U and λ, this constraint on λ is sufficient to resolve this issue of
strict inequality.
Additionally, note that the specific restrictions on the β vector are, in some
sense, restrictions on the rationality of the consumer. If the cost of consideration
were to exceed the actual cost of a good, it would definitely not be rational for
the consumer to include that good in the consideration set. When it comes to
implementing the linear program, I solve the linear programs for all levels of β
via a grid search and then reject rationality if any of the βs are too high, as
according to equation (2.27). Using this method allows the program to find the
maximum β at which the consumer can be just considered rational for any good.
The maximum β serves as the lower bound on the set of identified β’s for which
the consumer is rational, with prices being the upper bound.
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2.4 Implementation
As in chapter 1, the Stanford Basket Dataset is used for the analysis in chapter
2; specifically, a description can be found in section 1.4.1
2.4.1 Results
2.4.1.1 Cost of Consideration
The following analysis of the consideration set cost are in terms of a lower
bound. The reason for this is due to the rationality constraint. If there are
βk > pk, then this suggests there should be zero consumption for that good. As a
result, that particular β is not identified by the linear program. As such, the esti-
mated cost captures the lowest cost of consideration given the goods with positive
consumption. Additionally, for computational ease, in the following analysis, it is
assumed that β is constant across good and time (still heterogeneous). In terms
of robustness checks, under all different scenarios15, this assumption of estimating
an ‘average’ β did not make any substantial difference to the estimation. The re-
sults were also robust to suitable parameterisation of θ2 and θ3, as well as different
choices of smoothing functions16, and different variations of the programming rou-
tine17. In practice, as long as θ2 is smaller than the smallest quantity purchased
of any good, there are no issues with this parameter. This is because Theorem 1
will hold as the cost function is convex for quantities larger thanθ2). After some
calibration, the changes in the results were minimal (and not noticeable) even
when θ3 was as low as 9. This is because the cost function drops back down to the
asymptote sufficiently quickly to make immaterial differences in the estimation.
Recall from Theorem 1, that the cost of consideration can be seen as a price
distortion, given a positive quantity of a good consumed. As the cost function
is normalised appropriately, the coefficient on the coefficient measures the price
15Varying β across good and time and varying β only across time/good keeping it constant
across good/time.
16Both convex and non-convex.
17Convex optimisation routines, mixed-integer programming, and different forms of linear
program
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distortion directly as a result of consideration. Figure 2.4 presents an average
cost over goods and observations for each individual is shown. For example, if
an individual has an estimated average cost of 2 (β¯=2), if the average price they
faced was $5, then the individual behaved as if they were faced with a price of
$7 (in order to rationalise their choices), in essence, it cost them an additional $2
to consider the goods they bought. In figure 2.5, instead of plotting simply the
average cost, the average cost as a proportion of expenditure is plotted. So in
the above example, if the expenditure on a bundle of 10 goods was $300, and the
average cost of consideration was 2, then the total average cost of consideration
would be $2 ∗ 10, hence as a proportion of observed expenditure, this would be
20
300
.
From figure 2.4, in ascending order, for roughly 100 of these households, the
average cost of consideration is virtually 0 suggesting that those households are
not constrained by consideration.18 However, the remaining households appear to
exhibit some use of consideration sets with positive β¯’s. There were only 2 house-
holds who failed to satisfy the rationality inequalities and for those households,
their average β¯’s were extremely high suggesting some other forces of irrationality
contrasting with around 80% of households who were found to be pure GARP
violators.19
Figure 2.5 shows the cost of consideration as a proportion of expenditure. Simply
put, it is the percentage of consideration cost relative to the amount actually spent.
As per the figure, the highest proportional consideration cost is approximately 9%.
This suggests that for this individual household, the cost of consideration (on av-
erage) is equivalent to 9% of what they spent.
2.4.1.2 Power and Prediction
The most obvious dimension of performance of revealed preference tests is the pass
rate i.e. the proportion of households that can be rationalised within the specified
18Note that the graph looks stepwise in nature due to the grid search used in the estimation.
19In the sense that, when it comes to the revealed preference approach, there is (usually) only
1 contextual way to be rational, but this can be violated in many fashions.
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Figure 2.4: Average cost of consideration (β)
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Figure 2.5: Average cost of consideration as a proportion of expenditure
model. The results here show that only 2 out of 494 households failed to be
rational which suggests an almost perfect pass rate. Although this can be seen as
a positive result from an empirical point of view, it is important to know how ‘high’
is a ‘high’ pass rate. This is where the concept of power needs to be introduced,
in the sense of Bronars (1987). In order to check that the revealed preference
test is actually able to discern between random and irrational behaviour, it would
be wise to check whether the pass rate for random budget sets is low. This is
the concept of a power measure. If this is the case, then this is good evidence
that the revealed preference test is not simply ‘passing’ everyone but is able to
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tell irrational behaviour from random behaviour. For this particular setting and
dataset, the power measure was approximately 90% which suggests roughly only
10% of random behaviour was deemed rational.20
The metric that is most commonly used combines the power measure and the
pass rate, namely, predictive success. Although it is simply the pass rate minus (1 -
power measure), this measure has an axiomatic backing (Selten (1991), Beatty and
Crawford (2011)) as so is considered to be one of the most informative measures
of success. In this case, the predictive success is around 90% which suggests that,
with these data, there is strong evidence to suggest the use of consideration sets
in the way that is explained in previous sections.
An online appendix shows that these results are extremely robust to the param-
eterisation of the consideration set constraint, the choice of smoothing functions,
as well as different programming methods such as convex as well as non-convex
optimisation routines.
2.4.1.3 Correlation with CCEI
One might argue that there could be a link between rationality as measured by
the CCEI and the cost of consideration. Based on a simple correlation between the
average βs and the average CCEIs for each household, there does appear to be a
negative relationship. In this specific case, the correlation is approximately -0.32,
somewhat suggesting that those who are more rational may be more likely to have
lower consideration set costs. A correlation of -0.4 is achieved when using the pro-
portional consideration set cost again providing more promising evidence for the
potential link between more classically defined rationality and consideration sets.
Additionally, for this particular dataset, the consumers are typically more ratio-
nal than consumer from other scanner datasets which further elaborates the point
that it would be perhaps unwise to separate consideration sets and rationality.21
20In the sense that random behaviour is considered completely irrational, this implies a ‘per-
fect’ model should have a power measure of 100%. This idea of randomness vs. irrationality
originates from Becker (1962).
21This could be a topic of further interest but with only the use of the average β, future work
will need to see how this correlation changes with a more elaborate estimation of β.
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In a sense, this correlation is not altogether surprising given the interpretation
of the costs of consideration and the rationality indices used. The cost of con-
sidering additional goods can be interpreted as a price distortion meaning that
consumers are making bundle choices as if they are facing higher prices. From the
economist’s point of view, in order to rationalise the choices made, it is as if the
consumer wastes income because they are choosing bundles as if they are more
expensive than they actually are. Given that the 1-CCEI is a measure of how
much income is wasted, this correlation corroborates the idea that consideration
set costs could be a source of irrationality. In a sense, this price distortion leads
to bundle choices that are not completely rational, but can be rationalised by the
cost of consideration set model, but only up to a certain point.
2.4.1.4 Empirical Results
Table 1 in Section B.2 reports a set of regressions of the consideration set cost,
both absolute and as a proportion of expenditure, on a selection of demographic
variables from the Stanford Basket Dataset.22 The demographic data collected
were dummy variables for age23, income24, family size25, and education26.
In terms of the the rationality indices, both the CCEI and (1-Money Pump
Index) (see Echenique et. al (2011) for more details), appear to be negatively as-
sociated with consideration set cost.27 This was expected given the unconditional
correlation calculated previously. The regressions seem to suggest that more ir-
rational agents are typically those with higher consideration set costs which is
consistent with the idea that rational agents are better at making decisions.28
The regressions seem to suggest that those with larger families, higher income,
and more education are more susceptible to higher consideration cost. On one
hand, this direction make sense if those types of agents are more constrained in
22Households with missing demographics were omitted from the regressions.
23OldAge > 65, MidAge ∈ [30,65]
24HighIncome > $45000, MidIncome ∈ [$20000,$45000]
25LargeFamily > 4, MidFamily ∈ [3,4]
26High School, College; Average education across partners.
27The larger is 1-CCEI/MPI, the more irrational the agent.
28At least in terms of the rationality paradigm as defined by revealed preference theory.
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terms of time. For example, the main shopper from the larger family may have
less time to ‘shop around’ which may lead to a relative efficiency loss in terms of
information resulting in a higher consideration set cost. Those with higher incomes
(potentially as a result of more education) may also be time constrained in similar
way, and simply choose their goods in a ‘satisficing’ manner, yet, resulting in a
cost of consideration. On the other hand, it would not have been surprising to see
negative coefficients on the education variable as it would be reasonable to believe
that more educated individuals are more capable of making better decisions.
The coefficients on the age variables seem to suggest that older agents tend to
make better decisions in terms of consideration cost. This may be because they are
more experienced and have had more opportunities to improve their information
set. Also, the oldest cohort may have more time to shop and thus make better
decisions (as mentioned in the previous paragraph). This may be the case on
average, but it is not unlikely that this does not apply in several specific cases.
2.5 Concluding remarks
Revealed preference analysis incorporating consideration sets naturally requires
a less strict form of rationality than otherwise prescribed owing to the additional
cost of consideration. With a unique contribution to the literature, consumers may
only consider a subset of the goods available to them as the cost of consideration
is too high. This is modelled via a modified budget constraint which incorporates,
what is essentially, a fixed cost of consideration. By modifying the existing budget
constraint, the cost of consideration can be interpreted in terms of expenditure
rather than an arbitrary measure of cognitive ability. Alongside papers such as
Demuynck and Seel (2018), this chapter attempts to bring forward the case of a
broader and deeper theory of consideration sets.
Via a modified linear programming algorithm, I am able to semi-parametrically
estimate the costs associated with consideration sets using revealed preference the-
ory. With an application to a scanner dataset, for the vast majority of individuals,
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the model cannot reject the use of consideration sets in the presence of suitable
restrictions with an estimated average consideration set cost of 2% of monthly ex-
penditure. Interestingly, there also appears to be a strong link between consumer
rationality and limited consideration.
There are clearly many more opportunities for research in this area such as
applying the model to other datasets in which the consumers are (on average) less
rational than the ones presented in this chapter. This would allow for a greater
variation in consideration costs which would be ideal for some form of empirical
work in terms of demographic factors. This could go some way towards explaining
exactly how and why consideration costs can differ across consumers. Another
interesting question would be to examine how the above analysis changes when
decisions are made on a discrete basis rather than a continuous one, in the style
of Polisson and Quah (2013). This would also facilitate the use of the originally
proposed and most intuitive consideration set constraint.
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Chapter 3
Choices with just-noticeable
differences or status quo - Is
there a (noticeable) difference?
3.1 Introduction
1 Reference-dependent utility models of human behaviour have received ample
notice from both theoretical and applied economists. One particular pattern of
such behaviour is that of status quo bias (SQB), a term originally coined by
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988), and a concept seemingly at odds with textbook
definitions of economic rationality.2 This is what provides the main motivation
behind this chapter; I propose a choice theory that explains the presence of SQB,
and its effects on choice behaviour, with the fundamental principle of just-noticable
differences (JNDs).
First introduced into the economics literature by Luce (1956), a JND is the
1For this specific chapter, I am grateful to Ran Spiegler, Richard Blundell, Fernanda Senra
de Moura, Rube´n Poblete Cazenave, Ryan Kendall, and Terri Kneeland for critical stimulating
discussions. I would also like to extend my gratitude, non-exhaustively and alphabetically, to
Roland Benabou, Chris Chambers, Syngjoo Choi, Inga Deimen, Pawe l Dziewulski, Kfir Eliaz,
Andrew Ellis, William Fuchs, Gilat Levy, Yusufcan Masatlioglu, Stefania Minardi, Pietro Ortol-
eva, Thomas Pugh, Joao Ramos, Silvia Sarpietro, Roberto Serrano, Tomasz Strzalecki, Severine
Toussaert, Christopher Tyson, Stephanie Wang, and seminar participants at FUR 2018 for in-
valuable suggestions and comments.
2In the sense that an agent can continually purchase an alternative/set of alternatives, that,
from the economist’s point of view, appears worse for the agent.
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minimal stimulus required to be able to compare/perceive change.3 A common
and prevalent example comes from the marketing literature where adjustments
in price are considered the most salient, but changes in, for example, the weight
or size of a product are not as noticeable.4 Firms, in turn, tend to exploit the
fact that consumers are seemingly not perceiving these changes in order to further
maximise profits. From the economics literature, the famous example that comes
from Luce (1956), involving coffee and sugar: If there are 401 cups of coffee in
a row, each with an additional grain of sugar than the previous cup. In general,
it will be impossible to tell the difference between 2 consecutive cups. However,
cups that are not near each other will be easily comparable. As is clear from
this example, JNDs were introduced in order to explain intransitive indifference.
However, more critically, these examples highlight that people are imperfect in
their ability to compare with absolute precision. In utility terms, this is to say
that x is preferred to y if u(x) > u(y) + . So x is only preferred if it has higher
utility than y and by the JND, .5 In this chapter, I show that SQB is a major
implication of imprecise perceptibility.
In this setting, SQB comes from an inclination to choose a default option/current
choice when decision-making. By relaxing completeness6 of the preferences, Masatli-
oglu and Ok (2005) are able to represent utility as a vector.7 Using this, they
establish a choice procedure such that the status quo initially eliminates any al-
ternatives that are worse than it (in any number of dimension of utility), otherwise,
the status quo remains chosen. Note that, without this vector representation in
the first stage (and with perfect discrimination), there is no role for the status
quo, as the choice problem simply becomes standard. In other words, in the case
where there is no JND utility and just single-valued utility, then the status quo
and the choice procedure become trivial as the status quo will always/never be
chosen if it is the best/worst alternative. Thus, in the setting of Masatlioglu
3Introduced by psychophysicists, Weber (1834), Fechner (1860).
4http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-40703866 provide a whole list of goods, for example,
Toblerone chocolate, McVities biscuits etc..
5If |u(x)− u(y)| < , then x and y are said to be indistinguishable from each other.
6A binary relation, R, on a set A, is complete if either a R b or b R a, for all a, b in A
7The different dimensions can be thought of as different characteristics of an alternative.
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and Ok (2005) choice behaviour without multi-valued utility would be observa-
tionally equivalent to standard utility and thus would not explain SQB. It is the
relaxation of completeness in the first stage that is vital in providing the vector
representation, and thus ensuring the status quo is able to actually effect choice
behaviour.8 Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) is one of the most important and influ-
ential papers in the literature of axiomatising utility functions that are consistent
with behaviours that are considered explainable by classical reference-dependence
utility (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman (1991, 1992), Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006)).
In parallel with Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), the chapter provides a compre-
hensive understanding of SQB with an axiomatic approach to its choice procedure
and utility representation. The axioms presented here will be descriptive of choice
behaviour that should exhibit SQB, but will lead to a familiar utility representa-
tion. It is vital to point out that the representation offered by Masatlioglu and
Ok (2005) should be regarded as a specific example of status quo bias, and how
a status quo can effect choice behaviour. As such, I view their representation as
a special case of a more general notion of status quo bias, as according to the
literature in behavioural economics. I achieve this generalisation with the JND
utility representation. This is illustrated further with examples below, involving
both examples of different choice behaviours, and stylised utility representations.
The work I present in this chapter should be seen as an accompaniment to the
literature by offering a generalised representation of the idea of SQB with the clas-
sic JND utility representation, thus explaining a behavioural phenomenon with a
longstanding adage of economic theory.
Conceptually, SQB is an interesting behavioural phenomenon as it cannot be
typically explained by standard economic arguments. This is to say that, an
economist might observe (choice) behaviour that is not consistent with standard
utility models. For example, an individual at a supermarket may simply overlook
other products in favour of a good that they have already purchased, even if those
products may be better (in some, or all dimensions). A reasonable story (of many)
8Common examples: Current job, average consumption, previously purchased bundle, default
choice (opt-out/in), etc...
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for this would be that the individual is biased toward that which they already
know, hence the term, status quo bias. An alternative story, that would lead to
very similar (if not, the same) choice behaviour is one in which the individual does
consider the other products but does not shift away from the choice that they are
comfortable with unless there is another alternative which is substantially better
than their status quo (again, potentially, in some, or all dimensions). It is the
latter interpretation of this choice behaviour that further motivates this chapter
and will be what drives the following JND utility representation. Another common
example comes from a longstanding phenomenon in the UK where people seem
to stick with their current accounts despite the fact it is (essentially) costless and
even incentivised (free gifts etc...). It may be that agents do not perceive the
additional benefits from switching, and therefore decide to stick with their current
choice of bank.9
Furthermore, this kind of utility representation may also explain many other
kinds of behaviour (e.g. intransitive indifference) that are not necessarily iden-
tifiable as consistent with SQB, but may be potentially rationalised by a JND
representation. Equivalently, choice behaviour that is consistent with SQB may
always be represented by JND utility, but, not all cases of choices with JND repre-
sentations can be applied to situations with SQB. In what follows, the SQB utility
representation of Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) can be derived from the theorem
that yields JND utility representation, but not always conversely. This comes as a
natural consequence of the way that the main SQB axioms have been formulated.
An additional interesting result can be shown. Suppose further that a good
or product can be described completely as a vector of characteristics. This means
that comparisons between alternatives are done pair-wise for each characteristic.
In this case, it is also possible to explain SQB behaviour with JNDs. As per the
story above, if an individual does not move away from their current choice, it may
be because there are no other alternatives that are noticeably better in all the
characteristics. This gives rise to an interesting question of how to make choices
9https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-44522630 - gives a brief overview of the analysis done
by the Competition and Markets Authority.
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over goods when comparisons over characteristics are done with imperceptibility.
Provided the agents aggregate the characteristics consistently, it is possible to
show that agents can have either perfect or imperfect perceptibility over their
final choice of goods. This is explained in much further detail in Appendix C.2.
The chapter is organised in the following way: the remainder of Section 3.1 pro-
vides examples of how SQB behaviour can be explained by a JND representation.
Section 3.2 introduces the main axioms and representation of the paper.10 Section
3.3 contains a brief literature review with Section 3.4 concluding. All proofs can
be found in the accompanying appendix.
3.1.1 Example Representations
The following examples describe what can be predicted of choice behaviours
in a framework with status quo in terms of the Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) rep-
resentation and contrasts those with what is prescribed by the representation of
this chapter vis-a`-vis JND utility.
3.1.1.1 Comparisons with representation from Masatlioglu and Ok
(2005)
The following two examples of SQB using Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) appeal to a
vector representation of utility. An interpretation of this is that each component
of the utility vector represents a characteristic/feature of an alternative.11
Example 1a Suppose X ≡ {a, b, c, d, x}, u(X) ⊂ R2, with u(x) = (2, 1),
u(a) = (4, 8), u(b) = (7, 3), u(c) = (1, 4), u(d) = (4, 0.5), with x being the
status quo.12
10Section C.2 presents intuition and a plausible explanation on how to aggregate preferences
over (a finite number of) characteristics of goods, if those characteristics are governed by JND
preferences.
11In this sense, in order to explain SQB, there is an appeal to relaxing completeness to get
the vector utility representation.
12Note that the utilities are vectors to draw an easier comparison with the examples from
Masatlioglu and Ok (2005). However, in these examples, what is actually being compared with
JND utilities is the post-aggregation utilities of Masatlioglu and Ok (2005).
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Under Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), the status quo, x, would do the job of elim-
inating c and d as x is better than c and d in some dimension of utility. The
agent is then posed with the choice problem with just a and b which the agent can
easily evaluate with some aggregator function mapping the multi-valued utility
back to R. For example, suppose the aggregator is the product of the elements
i.e. g(u(x)) = 2, g(u(a)) = 32, and g(u(b)) = 21, so a is chosen.13
Example 1b Now suppose that X ≡ {e, f, g, h, x} with u(x) = (4, 4), u(e) =
(1, 6), u(f) = (5, 5), u(g) = (1, 2), u(h) = (4.6, 3.6), with x being the status quo.
From Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), e, h, and g are eliminated by the status quo,
and, with the same aggregator as before, f is chosen. This highlights an interesting
feature of their model. Alternative h is not too dissimilar to the status quo, in
fact, it is only marginally worse (and better) in one dimension of utility. However,
their choice procedure is such that the status quo eliminates any alternative worse
than it in any dimension of utility, even if it is better in all others. In essence,
even if u(h) = (500, 3.9), it would still be eliminated.
3.1.1.2 Example JND representations of SQB
Example 2a Suppose X ≡ {a, b, c, d, x}, with v(x) = 2, v(a) = 32, v(b) = 21,
v(c) = 4, v(d) = 2, with x being the status quo.
Recall that JND utility is such that alternative p is (strictly) preferred to alter-
native q when v(p) > v(q) + . Even in the case where  is large and  < 30,
the status quo is eliminated by a as it would be noticeably better. If  ∈ [0, 11),
then alternative a is the unique choice. This example mirrors Example 1a above,
however it did not appeal to a vector utility representation with the status quo
eliminating alternatives in a first stage of a choice procedure. Rather, the JND
utility simply choses the maximal alternative, in a noticeable sense, without the
need to decompose the utility into characteristics.
For clarity of comparison, the aggregator function used in Example 1a cor-
roborates exactly with the utilities in Example 2a. Thus, both Example 1a and
13The final choice of alternative is dependent on the aggregator function.
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Example 2a show that the Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) representation and JND
utility representation can rationalise the same choices.
Example 2b Now suppose that X ≡ {e, f, g, h, x} with v(x) = 16, v(e) = 6,
u(f) = 25, u(g) = 2, u(h) = 16.56, with x being the status quo.
Again, in direct comparison with Example 1b, instead of dealing with vector utili-
ties, this example deals directly with the aggregated utilities. There are two inter-
esting choice behaviours here that are different from Masatlioglu and Ok (2005).
Firstly, alternative h is not eliminated by the status quo as the status quo can
never be the strictly preferred option. In fact, h can eliminate the status quo with
a small enough JND. Secondly, if  ∈ (8.44, 9), not only is h not eliminated by it
can also be chosen as it would not be noticeably worse than (the objectively best)
alternative f .
This example shows that there are sensible choice behaviours that can never be
explained by Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) but are rationalisable by a JND utility
function. From the economist’s point of view, the JND utility representation
allows agents to choose an objectively worse alternative. The explanation for this
being that agents may not be particularly concerned by marginal improvements
to their current choice.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Primer
To ensure that the following representations are clear, this section will provide a
brief introduction to semiorders and interval orders, and their respective represen-
tations. I refer the interested reader to Luce (1956) and Fishburn (1975/85) for
further details.
Let R denote a generic binary relation on a finite set A, meaning that R is a
subset of A×A. In essence, the binary relation is a set of ordered pairs of elements
from A. If an ordered pair, say, (x, y) belongs to R, this is written as xRy. If
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x, y do not belong to R, this is written as x¬Ry The relevant properties of binary
relations that are required for this chapter are:
Reflexivity: a R a
Irreflexivity: a ¬R a
Transitivity: [a R b and b R c] =⇒ a R c
Semitransitivity: [a R b and b R c] =⇒ [a R d or d R c]
Interval Order Condition: [a R b and c R d] =⇒ [a R d or c R b]
for all a, b, c, d ∈ A.
A binary relation, I , is an interval order if it satisfies irreflexivity, and the interval
order condition. It is a standard result that if I is an interval order on A, then
there exists a function g : A → R, and a positive threshold function δ : A → R+
such that, for all x, y ∈ A, then x I y ⇐⇒ g(x) ≥ g(y) + δ(y). The threshold
function δ(.) is what determines the (utility) level beyond which alternatives can
be compared. Similarly, in the language of preferences, we can say that x is
preferred to y if it is “substantially better” than y, where the threshold for being
“substantially better” is a function of the alternatives. As above, in the absence of
a strict preference, i.e. neither x I y nor y I x, then x and y are not perceptibly
different from each other.
A binary relation, S, is a semiorder if it satisfies irreflexivity, semitransitivity,
and the interval order condition, thus implying that a semiorder is a semitransitive
interval order. It has been shown that if S is semiorder on A, then there exists
a function g : A → R, and a constant  > 0 such that, for all x, y ∈ A, then
x S y ⇐⇒ g(x) ≥ g(y) + . This constant  is what is commonly referred to
as the just-noticeable difference. In the language of preferences, we can say that
x is strictly preferred to y if it “substantially better” than y. In the absence of
a strict preference, i.e. neither x S y nor y S x, then x and y are considered
indistinguishable from each other.
Both of these notions and representations will play a large role in the repre-
sentation theorems to follow.
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3.2.2 Axioms
Let X be a non-empty finite set where each element of X is an alternative i.e. the
space of all alternatives. For later exposition, let  denote an element such that
 6∈ X. x ∈ {X ∪ } is then a generic element of X ∪ . Let S¯ ⊂ X denote a
generic non-empty subset of X which is augmented with x such that S is S¯ ∪{x}.
So S is the choice set; this is simply a subset of X which also includes x. A choice
problem is denoted as (S,x) such that when x = , then this is a problem without
a status quo, and when x ∈ S, this is a choice problem with status quo.
Define a choice correspondence c(·, ·) such that, for all (S, x), c(S, x) ⊆ S
i.e. the choice correspondence is a mapping from the choice problem back to
some (non-empty) subset of itself.14 The following are conditions on the choice
correspondence that are consistent with status quo bias and a JND representation.
Axiom α For any (A, x), (B, x), if y ∈ B ⊆ A and y ∈ c(A, x)
=⇒ y ∈ c(B, x)
Axiom δ For any (A, x), if z, y ∈ c(A, x), and A ⊆ B
=⇒ {y} 6= c(B, x)
These are simply Sen’s (1971) α and δ properties with the added notation of
status quo.15 Axiom α requires that an alternative remains chosen even after
other alternatives are removed. Axiom δ requires that alternatives chosen before
a choice set is expanded are not uniquely chosen after the choice set is expanded.
Consider the following scenario (which will be carried throughout the chapter)
involving Mr. Smith, who is a food critic. When Mr. Smith is travelling, his
status quo cuisine depends on the country he is visiting, but when Mr. Smith is
at home, he does not have a status quo cuisine.
To illustrate Axiom α, suppose Mr. Smith has to choose from German, Italian
and French cuisine and he chooses Italian. If German or French cuisine become
14The 2nd argument just makes explicit whether it is a status quo choice problem or otherwise
15Sen’s α property is also referred to as the contraction axioms, referring to the concept of the
independence of irrelevant alternatives.
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unavailable, then Mr. Smith continues choosing Italian. So, in the presence of
fewer options of cuisine, Mr. Smith must still continue choosing the cuisine he
chose before, given they are still available. This is true for whatever his status quo
is.
To illustrate Axiom δ, suppose Mr. Smith has to choose from German and
Italian cuisine and he chooses both German and Italian. If French cuisine also
becomes available, it cannot be the case that German food is uniquely chosen.
Again, this is true for regardless of his status quo.
Axiom D (Dominance) For any (A, x), if {y} = c(A, x), A ⊆ B and y ∈
c(B, )
=⇒ y ∈ c(B, x)
Axiom D and Axiom SQI come directly from Masatlioglu and Ok (2005). Axiom D
is referred to as the ‘Dominance’ axiom. The intuition being that if an alternative
is considered (strictly) better than the status quo, then, in a bigger choice problem
without status quo where that alternative is still chosen, it must remain chosen
when there is a status quo.
To illustrate Axiom D, suppose Mr. Smith is visiting Germany, where German
cuisine is his status quo. However, as Italian cuisine is also available, he decides not
to eat German food in favour of the Italian. When back home (i.e. no status quo
cuisine), if Mr. Smith is presented with options of Italian, German, and French
cuisine and chooses Italian, then when he returns to Germany, it would seem
sensible that he would still choose Italian even if French cuisine is also available.
Axiom SQI (Status Quo Irrelevance) For any (A, x), if y ∈ c(A, x) and there
does not exist a B ⊆ A with B 6= {x} and x ∈ c(B, x)
=⇒ y ∈ c(A, )
Axiom SQI is an ‘inapplicability’ property. If an alternative is chosen, and
there is not a subset of that choice problem where the status quo is chosen, then
the status quo played could not have played a role in the original choice problem.
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To illustrate Axiom SQI, suppose again that Mr. Smith is visiting Germany
(status quo cuisine is German). Mr. Smith has a choice from German, French,
Italian, and Spanish cuisine, and he chooses Italian. However, on other days,
although German cuisine is always available, some of the cuisines are not. On
those days, if Mr. Smith never chooses German cuisine (unless it is the only one
available), then it is as if Mr. Smith was choosing cuisine at home i.e. with no
status quo cuisine.
Axiom SQB For any (A, x), if y ∈ c(A, x)
=⇒ {y} = c(A, y)
Also from Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), Axiom SQB says that if an alternative is
chosen when it was not the status quo, then it is the only alternative when it
becomes the status quo. The idea being that there is absolutely no need to move
away from the status quo given it was already shown to be a preferred choice.
To illustrate Axiom SQB, suppose again that Mr. Smith is visiting Germany
(status quo cuisine is German). Mr. Smith decides to eat Italian food when his
choices are Italian, French, and German cuisine. When Mr. Smith travels to Italy,
and is offered the same choices, he refuses all other cuisine apart from Italian. So,
when the status quo cuisine changed to one that Mr. Smith had previously chosen,
he decides to stick with that and not try any other cuisine.
The following two axioms are important generalisations of Axiom SQB. By
using the following two axioms instead of Axiom SQB, it will be possible to derive
JND utility as a representation of SQB.
Axiom ASQB (Augmented Status Quo Bias) For any (A, x), there exists a B
(with A ∩B = ∅) such that,
if y ∈ c(A, x)
then, y ∈ c(A ∪B, y) and a 6∈ c(A ∪B, y), ∀a ∈ A \ {y}
Axiom ASQB describes the role that a status quo can play when a choice set
becomes larger. This axiom is what yields higher regard to the status quo. If y is
revealed preferred in a choice set with status quo x, and y is also revealed preferred
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in a “choice superset”, then when y is the status quo, only y and the additional
elements from the superset are choosable. It is in this sense that there is some
disposition for y which gives it a higher regard as y is the only element from the
original choice problem that remains chosen. However, there is not always neces-
sarily a complete tendency towards y given it is not the uniquely chosen element.
Unlike the previous axioms, Axiom ASQB introduces a rationality concession in
order to accommodate status quo bias behaviour; although a restrained form of
rationality, it is still permissible, nonetheless.
To illustrate Axiom ASQB, suppose again that Mr. Smith is visiting Germany
(status quo cuisine is German). Mr. Smith decides to go to one particular street
to eat where he can choose from German, Italian, and French cuisines, and he
decides on Italian. When Mr. Smith travels to Italy (where the status quo cuisine
is Italian) and he can eat the same cuisine as before, as well as Spanish and Greek
cuisine, then Mr. Smith continues choosing Italian food. Additionally, Mr. Smith
will not try any other cuisine except Spanish and/or Greek cuisine as they are
newly available.16
From this example, Axiom SQB is violated if Italian food is not uniquely
chosen. If Spanish and/or Greek cuisines are also chosen, then Axiom SQB is
violated as it requires that Italian food is chosen uniquely. So, in some sense,
Axiom ASQB potentially allows cuisines that are as good as/similar to Italian to
be chosen. Note that if Italian food is not chosen after it becomes the status quo,
this does not describe behaviour that is consistent with Mr. Smith being status
quo biased. In essence, Mr. Smith has not shown an inclination towards the status
16To see how this is a generalisation of Axiom SQB, if B is empty, then the only choosable
element is {y} when {y} becomes the status quo. In the example, this means that when Mr.
Smith was in Italy, he had the same choice as when he was in Germany, and therefore, only
chooses Italian food.
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quo cuisine and as such, both Axiom SQB and Axiom ASQB are violated.
Axiom DSQB (Distinct Status Quo Bias) For any (A, x) (B,w), (with A∩B =
∅),
if y ∈ c(A, x) and v ∈ c(B,w),
then
y ∈ c(A ∪B, y) and v 6∈ c(A ∪B, y) or
v ∈ c(A ∪B, v) and y 6∈ c(A ∪B, v)
Axiom DSQB describes the role of status quos when combining distinct choice
problems. Axiom DSQB says that, when two different choice problems are com-
bined, only choices from one of the individual choice problems can have the higher
status quo regard. Suppose y & v are revealed preferred in their respective choice
sets with status quos x & w. The axiom posits that y is also revealed preferred in
the combination of the choice sets when y becomes the status quo. However, the
choices that were originally made from B are no longer chosen, giving a higher
regard for the status quo from only one choice problem (or vice versa, if v becomes
the status quo). As with Axiom ASQB, this is an axiom that describes a higher
regard for the status quo but in a conservatively rational way
To illustrate Axiom DSQB, suppose Mr. Smith travels to France (status quo
cuisine is French) where he chooses Italian cuisine from a choice of Italian and
French cuisine. The following day, Mr. Smith goes to the Spain (status quo cuisine
is Spanish) to buy Greek cuisine when only Spanish and Greek food are available.
The following day, Mr. Smith travels to Italy where he has a choice from Italian,
French, Spanish, and Greek cuisines. Mr. Smith continues choosing Italian cuisine
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when everything is available, but decides against having Greek food.17,18
Again, from this example, Axiom SQB is violated if Italian food is not uniquely
chosen. If Greek cuisine is also chosen, then Axiom SQB is violated as it requires
that Italian food is chosen uniquely. Thus, Axiom DSQB can allow for cuisines
that are as good as/similar to Italian to be chosen, when it becomes the status
quo. If Italian food is not chosen after it becomes the status quo, or, Greek food
is chosen, this does not describe behaviour that is consistent with having a status
quo. For instance, if Mr. Smith really enjoys both Italian and Greek cuisines, but
still continues to choose Greek food when Italian is the status quo, then Mr. Smith
has not shown an inclination towards Italian food over the previously chosen Greek
cuisine i.e. he has not been biased by the status quo cuisine. As such, both Axiom
SQB and Axiom DSQB would be violated if Italian food is not chosen, and Axiom
SQB violated if anything but Italian food is chosen.
3.2.3 Main Representation
For some generic nonempty finite set, W , and status quo, w, define the following:
Γv,(W,w) ≡ {p ∈ W : v(p) > v(w) + }
Πv,(W,w) ≡ {p ∈ W :
∣∣v(p)− v(w)∣∣ ≤ }
Γv,(W,w) is the set of alternatives that are noticeably better than the status
quo whereas Πv,(W,w) contains the alternatives that are not noticeably better or
worse than the status quo.
Ωv,(W ) ≡ {q ∈ W : v(p) > v(q) +  for no p ∈ W}
Ωv,(W ) is the set of maximal in elements insofar as this is the set of alternatives
for which there are no other alternatives that are noticeably better.
17Note that, if Mr. Smith had decided to go Greece (status quo cuisine is Greek), and had
to choose from Italian, French, Spanish, and Greek cuisines, he would choose Greek cuisine and
would decide against Italian.
18To see how this is a generalisation of Axiom SQB, if B is empty, then there is no other
choice problem and {y} is still chosen from the original choice set, when {y} becomes the status
quo. If {y} is uniquely chosen, then it reduces to Axiom SQB. To guarantee this, both Axiom
DSQB and Axiom ASQB combined with empty B imply Axiom SQB. In the current example,
this means that Mr. Smith continues choosing Italian cuisine, when Italian cuisine becomes the
status quo.
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Theorem 2. Let S be a nonempty finite set. A choice correspondence c(·, ·)
satisfies Axiom α, Axiom δ, Axiom D, Axiom SQI, Axiom ASQB, and Axiom
DSQB, if, and only if, there exists a  ∈ R, a function v : S → R, such that
c(S, ) = Ωv,(S)
and
c(S, x) =

Πv,(S, x) Γv,(S, x) = ∅
Ωv,(Γv,(S, x)) otherwise
The theorem says that an agent chooses the best noticeable element or the set of
elements that are not noticeably different from the best element. This applies to
all elements including the status quo, but, there may exist some element/s which
is/are strictly but not noticeably better than the status quo, hence the status quo
bias.
Consider the choice problem where there is a status quo where the status quo
is the current alternative of the agent. If there do not exist any noticeably better
alternatives, the current choice remains chosen among the other alternatives that
are not noticeably better/worse than the status quo. For example, let us consider
the ubiquitous problem of buying a mobile phone.19 Suppose a Huawei phone user
is faced with a new choice between Huawei, Samsung, HTC, and Sony phones, all
of which operate using the Android operating system. If the user deems the HTC
and Sony phones absolutely superior to her current choice of Huawei and the
Samsung phone, she will decide over HTC and Sony phones. However, if the HTC
and Sony phones are noticeably worse, but the Samsung is not not noticeably worse
or better, she can continue choosing the Huawei or even switch to the Samsung
phone. So the user definitely moves away from her current choice if there is a
phone substantively better, otherwise, she continues using her current phone (or
something similar enough).
19Recall that brand loyalty is a form of status quo bias. See Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988)
for further examples and details.
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Now consider the choice problem where there is seemingly no status quo. In
this case, the agent simply chooses whichever alternative is noticeably best. In
essence, the agent simply chooses from a set of alternatives that are not noticeably
worse than any other alternative. As a representation of choice behaviour, the JND
utility has strong appeal from a psychological perspective, as such, it forms the
basis of behaviour even without a status quo alternative. The only real difference
between this and a choice problem with status quo is that the status quo is a
current choice, in essence, a reference point. However, without this reference
point, the agent still maintains their basic choice behaviour as represented by
JND utility. Given this, essentially, the representation above always gives rise to
the risk of there being SQB behaviour.
Taking this from another perspective, a natural question could be, why does
the agent not have a standard utility function in the absence of a status quo?
As written above, the representation of behaviour that allows for some level of
inexact perception allows a much greater degree of realism. More specifically, in
the standard utility case, there is no real role for a status quo, as explained in the
introduction. From a modelling point of view, it makes little sense to have the
agent’s decision making represented by JND utility simply because they have a
status quo, and have a standard utility function when there is no reference point.
In a sense, the agent can always be susceptible to status quo bias and thus should
have JND utility with and without a defined status quo. Given that perfect dis-
crimination can be extremely tricky even in the simplest situations, as supported
by the psychology literature, and physics literature, it is not unreasonable to be-
lieve that simple choice behaviour can be represented by JND utility. However,
as is the purpose of this chapter, having such a representation does facilitate in
explaining behavioural phenomenon such as SQB, especially given that the axioms
are descriptive of SQB.
From above, it is clear that c(S, x) ⊆ c(S, ) i.e. choice problems with a status
quo can always be derived from a choice problem without a status quo due to
JND utility. However, from observable choice data, it might not be the case that
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all choice behaviour consistent with JND utility can be necessarily rationalised
by status quo bias. With this representation, the agents still appear to be status
quo biased if there does not exist any alternatives that are noticeably better than
the status quo i.e. the agent continues to choose the status quo unless another
alternative is noticeably better. From the above representation, it is clear that
agents may choose an alternative that might be worse for them, but not noticeably
so.20 This is corroborated by the following:
Implication 2.1. Let X be a nonempty finite set. Theorem 1 of Masatlioglu and
Ok (2005) holds if a choice correspondence c(·, ·) satisfies Axiom α, Axiom δ,
Axiom D, Axiom SQI, Axiom ASQB, and Axiom DSQB.
Interestingly, this implication essentially says that, under a slightly more general
choice structure, the strong representation of SQB given by Masatlioglu and Ok
(2005) can be seen as a special case of a JND representation.21 In essence, it
is possible to get the representation of Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), but it is not
possible to get the above axioms from their representation.
To illustrate this point, returning to Examples 1b and 2b, suppose that X ≡
{e, f, g, h, x} with u(x) = (4, 4), u(f) = (5, 5), u(g) = (1, 2), u(h) = (4.6, 1), with
x being the status quo. In this case, the choice procedure of Masatlioglu and Ok
(2005) eliminates g and h, and f is chosen. As long as these vectors are aggregated
with a strictly increasing function, irrespective of any level of imperception (i.e.
for any JND value), f will always remain in the maximal set, and thus is always
chosen. Bringing this to the cuisines example, if Mr. Smith decides to go to one
particular street to eat where he can choose from German, Italian, and French
cuisines, and he decides on Italian, he must continue choosing Italian if it becomes
the status quo cuisine. If no other cuisines become available when the status quo
20A stark example: if v(c) = 4, v(d) = 6, v(e) = 6.5, v(f) = 7, with  = 1, then a ordinary
choice problem would choose e and f . In a status quo choice problem, if the status quo is e, then
the agent can continue to choose e as there is nothing noticeably better. This is also true if the
status quo is f . Conditional on observing e or f , this observed choice could have come from a
choice problem without status quo. Note that, if the status quo was c, it would not remain the
status quo as there are alternatives noticeably better.
21As far as is known, no link between incompleteness and intransitive indifference has been
made in the literature. It may be the case that there is some link between these properties that
has yet to be discovered, at least, beyond SQB.
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changes, then Italian cuisine still continues being chosen.
To further illustrate this implication, suppose that a new alternative becomes
available such that u(y) = (5 + 1, 5− ˆ2), with the new status quo being f .
The choice procedure of Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) eliminates x, g, h, and y,
with f being chosen as there is no alternative that beats the status quo in both
dimensions. So here, y is eliminated even if barely differs from the status quo.
However, there must exist a (class of) strictly increasing function(s), v : R2 → R
such that v(u(y)) > v(u(f)). If it is the case that v(u(y)) > v(u(f)) + , i.e.
the new alternative is noticeably better than the status quo, then y is chosen,
and the previous status quo is no longer chosen. This represents an individual
who made a choice as if they did not have a status quo, and simply just chose
the maximal alternative. However, if |v(u(y)) − v(u(f))| < , although the new
alternative is technically better, it is not noticeably better, thus, both f and y are
chosen. In essence, it is possible for new alternatives to be similar enough to the
current status quo such that they are choosable. Bringing this back to the cuisine
example, if Mr. Smith travels to Italy where Italian is the status quo cuisine,
and Spanish cuisine is newly available, if Spanish is similar enough to the Italian
cuisine, then it can also be chosen. This highlights that both representations
predict that the status quo cuisine is chosen, however, Masatlioglu and Ok (2005)
would not be able to predict that anything similar is chosen. This is a result of
their first stage representation of SQB which would eliminate any alternative even
if it is marginally worse in any dimension. However, the representation of this
chapter does allow for other alternatives to be chosen, as long as they are similar
enough to the status quo.22
The implication describes the fact that choice behaviour that may have been
labelled as SQB as defined by Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), may be observation-
ally equivalent to JND-type behaviour. However, the converse is not necessarily
true; there may be many instances where JND representations are suitable and in
22Note that, if an alternative that is status quo is not chosen, this violates all the axioms
of SQB i.e. an individual that simply chooses irrespective of status quo would be naturally
unaffected by SQB.
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which a status quo essentially plays no role in the choice procedure. In this sense,
JNDs are able to explain different types of behaviour, one of which is SQB. The
simplest example comes directly from Luce (1956) where intransitive indifference
is explained, which is exactly what the JND representation is able to manage,
however, SQB as in Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), in general, would not be able to
explain the phenomenon of imperceptibility.23
3.2.4 Interval Order Representation
The previous theorem shows that JND utility is sufficient in explaining SQB be-
haviour. This relies upon a semiorder binary relation, which is what is required
for a JND utility. However, by construction, there is another interesting feature
of the previous theorem in that it is also capable of dealing with an interval order
binary relation; this gives rise to its own representation, but is similar to that of
Theorem 2.
As a reminder, a semiorder is a binary relation that obeys irreflexitivity, semi-
transitivity24, and the interval order condition25. An interval order is a binary
relation that is irreflexive and satisfies the interval order condition i.e. a semiorder
is simply a semitransitive interval order. Given the structure of the axioms, it is
also possible to achieve an interval order representation as given by the corollary
below. In essence, as can be seen from Section C.1, Axiom ASQB is what yields
semitransitivity, and Axiom DSQB is what yields the interval order condition.
The interpretation is similar to that of JND utility insofar as the representation
looks near identical except now that the JND is also a function of the alternatives.
For some generic nonempty finite set, W , and status quo, w, define the following:
Γv,(·)(W,w) ≡ {p ∈ W : v(p) > v(w) + (w)}
Πv,(·)(W,w) ≡ {p ∈ W :
∣∣v(p)− v(w)∣∣ ≤ (w)}
Ωv,(·)(W ) ≡ {q ∈ W : v(p) > v(q) + (q) for no p ∈ W}
23Naturally, there would be no expectation for their representation to explain phenomena
beyond SQB.
24 is semitransitive if ∀a, b, c, d ∈ X, a  b ∧ b  c =⇒ a  d ∨ d  c.
25 satisfies the IOC if ∀a, b, c, d ∈ X, a  b ∧ c  d =⇒ a  d ∨ c  b.
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Corollary 2.1. Let S be a nonempty finite set. A choice correspondence c(·, ·)
satisfies Axiom α, Axiom δ, Axiom D, Axiom SQI, and Axiom DSQB, if, and
only if, there exists a threshold function  : S → R+, a function v : S → R, such
that
c(S, ) = ΩI(S)
and
c(S, x) =

Πv,(·)(S, x) Γv,(·)(S, x) = ∅
Ωv,(·)(Γv,(·)(S, x)) otherwise
As can be seen by the definitions of Γv,(·)(·, ·), Πv,(·)(·, ·), and Ωv,(·)(·, ·), the
interpretation is as in Theorem 2 except that the comparison between alternatives
depends not just on the utility but on a JND function of the alternatives. In
terms of explaining SQB, the interpretation has remained essentially unchanged.
However, given some specification for the JND function, it might be possible to
observe different behaviour that is consistent with Corollary 2.1 but not necessarily
with Theorem 2. This is simply due to the fact that the semiorder required Axiom
ASQB and Axiom DSQB, whereas Corollary 2.1 needed only Axiom DSQB to show
that the binary relation is an interval order.
In actuality, this particular representation may have a somewhat different ex-
planation for SQB as alternatives that are being compared to the status quo are
specifically given a higher regard. However, this is simply because the JND is a
function of the alternative itself. In pure comparison terms, it is almost as if those
alternatives that are not the status quo receive some utility boost, and yet, this
representation can still explain SQB given that there is still this utility threshold.
One interpretation of a JND that is a function of the alternatives could be
that of a switching cost. The idea being that the agent must incur some cost of
switching from their status quo (or any other alternative), or perhaps that it is
not costless for the agent to compare alternatives. In essence, if there is some
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constant switching cost across alternatives, then this is the interpretation of given
by Theorem 2, as the JND is a constant. However, if the switching cost depends
on the comparison being made, then this is the interpretation of Corollary 2.1.
Another interesting interpretation is that of the endowment effect, a common
cognitive bias often studied in behavioural economics. It is mostly attributed to
the fact that agents are status quo biased. This is seen as a discrepancy in the
willingness-to-accept (WTA) and willingness-to-pay (WTP). In standard models,
the WTA should always be exactly equal to the WTP, as the WTA/WTP is simply
a minimum/maximum threshold value at which an agent is willing to sell/buy.26
This difference is seen as a result of an “endowment effect” given the observation
that people tend to require a higher selling value when in possession of the item
they are going to sell. The representation of Corollary 2.1 is able to provide an
explanation of this.
Consider Axiom DSQB which says that an SQB agent would decide against
choosing an alternative that was chosen previously from a different choice problem
(and with different status quo). Recall from Axiom ASQB that an SQB agent
would decide against anything chosen from the same choice problem before the
choice set was augmented. This means that with Axiom DSQB, there is a higher
regard for a particular status quo as that status quo is specifically chosen over an
alternative from another choice problem.
For example, suppose one choice set involved choosing between three large
mugs coloured red, blue, and green with a separate choice problem involving three
small mugs of the same colours. If an agent chooses a large blue mug when the
large green mug was the status quo, and similarly for the small mugs, when the
large blue mug becomes the status quo, the agent never chooses the small blue
mug. In some sense, the agent has a strong affinity to the large blue mug as
it is the status quo, especially as the previously chosen small blue mug is not
chosen. The same would be true, vice versa, if the status quo was the small blue
mug. So, there is something specific about the status quo mug that means that
26Typically, the endowment effect is explained in terms of prices with respect to WTA and
WTP.
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something that was chosen in a completely separate choice problem, is no longer
chosen.27 As such, the interval order representation is able to offer an explanation
for endowment-type effects.
3.3 Related Literature
As mentioned previously, Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) introduced the idea
and term of status quo bias into the economics literature. Although behavioural
economics provides natural deviations from standard models (for example, non-
exhaustively, Tversky and Kahneman (1991, 1992), Rabin (1998), Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2006)) to explain such phenomena, there is a large growing literature in de-
cision theory (for example, Masatlioglu et al. (2012), Manzini and Mariotti (2012),
Ok et al. (2015), Masatlioglu and Ok (2005, 2014), Frick (2016), Argenziano and
Gilboa (2017), and many others) with the aim of providing axiomatic foundations
to their utility representations for (what is normally considered) non-standard de-
cision making. I contribute to this literature by explaining SQB behaviour with an
existing utility representation i.e. JND utility, with the familiar choice procedure
of Simon (1955), Bewley (2002), Masatlioglu and Ok (2005).
Luce (1956), Scott and Suppes (1958), Jamison and Lau (1973), Fishburn
(1975) are key papers in the study of semiorders. Luce (1956) introduced the
semiorder binary relation as the primitive for an axiomatisation of JND utility.
Both Fishburn (1975), Jamison and Lau (1973) derive an equivalent set of axioms
with a choice function/correspondence primitive. These papers do not make spe-
cific mention of any specific behavioural phenomenon beyond imperceptibility as
a way of rationalising intransitive indifference. However, understanding the inter-
play of axioms was essential in devising axioms that allowed incorporation of a
status quo with a JND interpretation.
27It is in combining these axioms is what allows the JND to be constant over all comparisons,
as Axiom ASQB does not preclude any new alternative from being chosen.
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3.4 Concluding remarks
The choice theory presented in this chapter is able to incorporate a status quo
effect into a standard decision-making procedure with a classic just noticeable
difference representation. The channel for status quo bias is such that, conditional
on some current choice, the agent does not move away from this unless there is
an alternative that is necessarily and noticeably better. This representation also
gives rise to several plausible explanations for other behaviours that are relatable
to status quo bias.
An interesting parallel can be drawn with the literature on consideration sets.
Given the observability of status quo bias behaviour, and the fact that this can
be represented by JND utility, this gives further rise to the notion that consumers
choose within a consideration set, and that this set need not necessarily coincide
with what economists believe to be their choice set.28 Although JND utility is
derived from axioms of standard rationality combined with status quo, it is not
necessarily obvious why agents are not able/willing to notice some subset of alter-
natives even when there can exist better choices.29 Is there anything fundamental
or intrinsic about individuals that results in this behaviour? Is there a cost of
search/consideration? Do agents suffer from choice overload?30 Is there an op-
timal level of attention? These are questions have been tackled successfully in
the growing literature on limited consideration.31 These papers may provide more
fundamental answers as to what are the observable qualities of agents that give
rise to JND utility and, by extension, status quo bias.
28Horowitz and Louviere (1995), Spiegler and Eliaz (2011), Manzini and Mariotti (2014) etc...
29In a status quo bias framework, if an alternative is not noticeably better/worse, is it still in
the consideration set?
30The increased difficulty of choosing optimally for larger choice sets.
31For example, Frick (2016)
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Conclusion
This thesis comprises three chapters that use revealed preference theory and
decision theory to provide behavioural insights into consumer rationality, consid-
eration sets, and status quo bias.
The objective of Chapter 1 was to present analyses that combines the role of
consideration sets with economic rationality in the decision-making process using
revealed preference theory. Using a scanner panel dataset and a simulated dataset,
and applying two well-known measures of rationality and introducing a new index
of rationality, there is strong evidence that the consumer decision-making process
is more rational in the presence of consideration sets, defined exogenously as goods
with positive consumption. The role of consideration sets is reflected through in-
creasingly irrational consumption choices that can exacerbated by the ‘size’ of the
consideration set, as well as longer sequence lengths. From the regression analy-
sis, these measures of consideration set complexity, as well as certain demographic
factors, are correlated with rationality; specifically, when the consideration set is
larger and/or the sequence length is longer, there appears to be a negative corre-
lation with rationality. Overall, there is a clear relationship between the role of
consideration sets and revealed preference theory in the decision-making process
of the household. In this chapter, I have provided an initial insight into how these
concepts can be combined and how that this can improve our ability to study
economic behaviour, leading naturally on to Chapter 2.
Chapter 2 incorporates a natural extension to the canonical model of utility
which requires a less strict form of rationality than otherwise prescribed owing to
the additional cost of consideration. As a unique contribution to the literature,
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consumers may only consider a subset of the goods available to them if the cost of
consideration is too high. To model this, a modified budget constraint is used that
incorporates, what is essentially, a fixed cost of consideration. Through modifica-
tion of the existing standard budget constraint, the cost of consideration can be
interpreted in terms of expenditure as a means of a price distortion, rather than
any arbitrary measure of cognitive ability. This chapter attempts to bring forward
the case of a broader and deeper theory of consideration sets.
A natural extension to the work of Chapter 2 is applications to other price-
quantity datasets that have seemingly less rational individuals than the Stanford
Basket Dataset. This could allow for larger variation in consideration costs which
would be ideal for the reduced-form analysis in terms of the demographic factors.
Another interesting avenue that revealed preference frameworks can tend to avoid
is related to the analysis when decisions are made on a discrete basis rather than
a continuous one, as in the style of Polisson and Quah (2013). As the original
formation of the consideration set cost is that of a fixed cost, incorporating the
use of discrete choices, as opposed to choices from a continuum, could lead to
further interesting results and insights.
Chapter 3 presents a choice theory that incorporates a status quo effect into a
standard decision-making procedure with a just noticeable difference utility repre-
sentation. The contribution towards the understanding of status quo is such that,
conditional on some current choice, the agent does not move away from this unless
there is an alternative that is necessarily and noticeably better. This chapter also
shows there are consistent ways of aggregating finite preferences that are repre-
sented by JND utility, with aggregators that can also be a JND utility function
or a standard utility function.
One natural extension to this chapter would be related to dynamic choice. An
interesting idea that arises is whether time inconsistent decisions can be explained
from having some form dynamic JND utility i.e. the current period is considered
the ’status-quo’ period, and hence there is an inclination toward it. A further
extension to this chapter could include incorporation of uncertainty, which would
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require some form of independence axiom with respect to quality of alternatives.
In terms of the empirical side, a future project would involve relating the JND
utility representation to that of a class of random utility models, as is seen in
applied econometrics and industrial organisation. The basic premise of random
utility models is that utility can suffer from random shocks and with that there are
probabilities associated to making choices. If there does exist some relationship
between these random shocks in random utility models and the JND parameter,
this may shed new light on how economists think of JND utility, both economet-
rically and theoretically speaking.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Tables
Table 1.1 - Summary Statistics
Number of equivalence classes 24.47
(2.04)
Maximum 26
Minimum 14
Number of distinct goods per households 56
(21.65)
Sample standard deviation in parentheses.
Table 1.2 - Frequency of Equivalence Classes
Number of Longest possible partition Frequency
equivalence classes sequence length
14 13 1
16 11 2
17 10 4
18 9 4
19 8 7
20 7 12
21 6 14
22 5 24
23 4 46
24 3 70
25 2 93
26 1 217
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Table 1.3 - Rationality indices summary statistics without consideration sets
Cycle Lengths 2 2,3 2,3,4 2,3,4,5
Total number of households 494 494 494 494
Households violating GARP 395 396 396 396
Average MPI 0.0622 0.0612 0.0609 0.0604
Average GAV Index 0.0651 0.0649 0.0642 0.0642
Average (1-CCEI) 0.0263 0.0238 0.0231 0.0230
Median MPI 0.0597 0.0595 0.0591 0.0590
Median GAV Index 0.0646 0.0640 0.0635 0.0635
Median (1-CCEI) 0.0240 0.0209 0.0203 0.0202
Table 1.4 - Rationality indices summary statistics with consideration sets
Cycle Lengths 2 2,3 2,3,4 2,3,4,5
Number of households 184 184 114 68
Households violating GARP 83 50 28 12
Average MPI 0.0443 0.0442 0.0412 0.0358
Average GAV Index 0.0464 0.0464 0.0433 0.0382
Average (1-CCEI) 0.0187 0.0175 0.0137 0.0105
Median MPI 0.0419 0.0417 0.0385 0.0334
Median GAV Index 0.0428 0.0425 0.0395 0.0364
Median (1-CCEI) 0.0146 0.0138 0.0106 0.0095
Table 1.5 - Rationality indices summary statistics with consideration sets with 2
to 7 goods
Consideration set size 2 3 4 5 6 7
Number of households 118 178 184 184 184 184
Households violating GARP 80 82 83 83 83 83
Average sequence length 1.67 1.67 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.60
Average MPI 0.0423 0.0443 0.0443 0.0443 0.0443 0.0443
Average GAV Index 0.0459 0.0464 0.0464 0.0464 0.0464 0.0464
Average (1-CCEI) 0.0184 0.0187 0.0187 0.0187 0.0187 0.0187
Median MPI 0.0421 0.0418 0.0419 0.0419 0.0419 0.0419
Median GAV Index 0.0431 0.0428 0.0428 0.0428 0.0428 0.0428
Median (1-CCEI) 0.0150 0.0146 0.0146 0.0146 0.0146 0.0146
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Table 1.6 - Rationality indices summary statistics with consideration sets with 8
to 13 goods
Consideration set size 8 9 10 11 12 13
Number of households 157 130 96 63 18 10
Households violating GARP 78 67 45 28 6 6
Average sequence length 1.58 1.52 1.43 1.44 1.42 1.42
Average MPI 0.0444 0.0444 0.0511 0.0531 0.0513 0.0513
Average GAV Index 0.0464 0.0465 0.0541 0.0552 0.0537 0.0537
Average (1-CCEI) 0.0187 0.0188 0.0222 0.0232 0.0216 0.0216
Median MPI 0.0418 0.0419 0.0422 0.0424 0.0423 0.0423
Median GAV Index 0.0431 0.0430 0.0430 0.0455 0.0441 0.0441
Median (1-CCEI) 0.0146 0.0150 0.0151 0.0154 0.0146 0.0146
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Table 1.7 - Number of households with sequence length 2-6 and consideration set
size 3-10
Consideration set size
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
S
eq
u
en
ce
le
n
gt
h 1 65 101 106 106 106 116 90 67
2 35 48 54 54 54 20 23 17
3 12 20 19 19 19 16 10 12
4 5 4 3 3 3 9 4 0
5 1 5 1 1 1 5 2 0
6 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
Table 1.8 - Average MPI with sequence length 2-6 and consideration set size 3-10
Consideration set size
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
S
eq
u
en
ce
le
n
gt
h 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.0444 0.0446 0.0446 0.0446 0.0446 0.0446 0.0446 0.0495
3 0.0455 0.0506 0.0506 0.0506 0.0506 0.0506 0.0535 0.0634
4 0.0368 0.0581 0.0581 0.0581 0.0581 0.0581 0.0612 0.0671
5 0.0342 0.0586 0.0586 0.0586 0.0586 0.0586 0.0585 0.0729
6 0.0411 0.0598 0.0598 0.0598 0.0598 0.0598 0.0634 0.0838
Table 1.9 - Average (1-CCEI) with sequence length 2-6 and consideration set size
3-10
Consideration set size
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
S
eq
u
en
ce
le
n
gt
h 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.0188 0.0189 0.0189 0.0189 0.0189 0.0188 0.0188 0.0224
3 0.0176 0.0267 0.0267 0.0267 0.0267 0.0265 0.0232 0.0280
4 0.2000 0.0318 0.0318 0.0318 0.0318 0.0282 0.0203 0.0356
5 0.0249 0.0419 0.0419 0.0419 0.0419 0.0385 0.0273 0.0406
6 0.0179 0.0368 0.0368 0.0368 0.0368 0.0502 0.0320 0.0474
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A.2 Regressions
A.2.1 Table 7
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1-CCEI 1-CCEI 1-CCEI 1-CCEI 1-CCEI
LarFMSize -0.000151∗∗∗ -0.000134∗∗∗ -0.000108∗∗ -0.000098∗ -0.000097∗
(-4.32) (-3.77) (-2.79) (-1.98) (-1.99)
MidFMSize -0.0000713∗∗ -0.0000533∗ -0.0000386 -0.0000385 -0.0000385
(-2.91) (-2.07) (-1.39) (-1.38) (-1.37)
Highsch -0.0000824 -0.0000490 -0.0000472 -0.0000512 -0.0000519
(-1.65) (-0.95) (-0.91) (-0.81) (-0.83)
College -0.0000917 -0.0000466 -0.0000407 -0.0000333 -0.0000310
(-1.85) (-0.89) (-0.76) (-0.66) (-0.67)
HighIncome -0.0000660∗ -0.0000697 -0.0000678∗ -0.0000677∗
(-1.99) (-1.92) (-2.04) (-2.10)
MidIncome -0.0000871∗∗ -0.0000879∗∗ -0.0000878∗∗ -0.0000849∗∗
(-2.96) (-2.81) (-2.79) (-2.78)
OldAge 0.0000518 0.0000314 0.0000412
(1.34) (1.22) (1.30)
MidAge 0.0000670∗ 0.0000671∗ 0.0000671∗
(2.25) (2.25) (2.25)
ASL 0.0000655∗∗ 0.0000095
(2.79) (1.10)
ACSS 0.0000712∗
(2.05)
cons 0.000384∗∗∗ 0.000393∗∗∗ 0.000336∗∗∗ 0.000316∗∗∗ 0.000310∗∗∗
(8.23) (8.40) (5.41) (4.44) (4.41)
N 156000 156000 156000 156000 156000
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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A.3 Simulations
A.3.1 Simulated Dataset
The reason for simulating households1 is so that I can have separate datasets which
represent set levels of rationality for different consumers. This is so that I am able
to do some sensitivity analysis across CCEI for more irrational decisions and see if
any of the patterns still exist/ are exacerbated by individuals with lower CCEIs.
One of the issues with the empirical data is that individuals tend to be fairly
rational (score CCEIs greater than 0.95), and as such, it may be tricky to discern
increases in rationality. By constructing datasets with individuals that start with
lower CCEIs, it may be easier to detect potential patterns.
For example, suppose there is an individual who has an average CCEI level
of 0.5. So, in order to rationalise this individual’s data, their income needs to
be relaxed by 50%. However, suppose this was calculated in the standard way,
without taking into account any limited consideration. What we want to see is
how rationality changes if we partition the dataset properly, according to their
consideration sets.
Using the same structure as the Stanford Basket Dataset, I reverse engineer
random consumption choices (given random prices) such that the data yield a
certain level of CCEI. Using the definition of the CCEI, I solve a large linear system
of equations in order to choose consumption levels of a certain number of goods for
2 bundles/weeks2 such that for each household, on average, the consumption and
price levels simulated provide a specifically chosen CCEI level. It is important to
note that the simulations for a particular CCEI are themselves subject to Monte-
Carlo simulations. This is to ensure that the simulated datasets for a particular
CCEI were not simply yielding special-case results. In essence, I simulate several
datasets with a fixed CCEI, collect the relevant numbers from each dataset and
take an average of these; any results explained using simulated data are based on
the initial CCEI simulation and the subsequent Monte-Carlo simulation. For the
1To be as consistent as possible with the Stanford Basket Dataset, I simulated 494 households.
2I solve for a sequence length of 2 for computational ease.
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sake of the simulations, I chose an average CCEI of 0.85.3
A.3.2 Algorithm
A. Choose number of goods (G) and number of bundles (B) based on identifi-
ability
i.e. the number of equations has to be at least as large as number of vari-
ables. In this instance, the number of variables is the number of actual
goods multiplied by the number of weeks(bundles) and the number of equa-
tions is based on the CCEI definition for a sequence length of 2 and income
feasibility.
G ∗B︸ ︷︷ ︸
No. of Variables
≤
No. of CCEI equations︷ ︸︸ ︷
2 ∗
 B
2
 + B︸︷︷︸
No. of Feasibility Constraints
(A.3.1)
G ∗B ≤ 2 ∗ B!
(B − 2)! ∗ 2! +B (A.3.2)
G ∗B ≤ 2 ∗ B ∗ (B − 1)!
(B − 2)! ∗ 2 +B (A.3.3)
G ≤ (B − 1)!
(B − 2)! + 1 (A.3.4)
G ≤ (B − 1) + 1 (A.3.5)
G ≤ B (A.3.6)
i.e. Number of goods has to be less than number of bundles.4
In the simulations completed for this chapter, I chose 4 to 12 consideration
3This is a fairly low score to get in applied revealed preference work. However, it is low
enough so that any discernible patterns are much more noticeable, but is high enough as not to
be unrealistic.
4If this were not the case, then it would be necessary to parameterise the system of equations,
which would mean setting quantities to some random numbers, which would artificially worsen
rationality, or setting them to zero as to not interfere with the measuring of rationality.
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sets from 12 goods for a total of 12 bundles.5
B. Given a fixed CCEI for the whole dataset, randomly choose CCEIs on the
household level. After this, randomly choose CCEIs for every sequence of
bundles. As I require a distribution such that the random draws have a mean
of the fixed CCEI with a low chance of outliers on the irrational side, I chose
a (truncated) log-normal distribution for 1-CCEI6 to exploit the desired skew
of the distribution. This choice seemed to be without loss of generality as
many distributions yielded the same result as long as I had the same moment
restrictions.7
Let X denote 1-CCEI ∼ lnN (µ, σ)
The moment conditions are as follows:
E[X] = eµ+
σ2
2 (A.3.7)
V [X] = (eσ
2 − 1) · e2µ+σ2 (A.3.8)
Choose E[X] equal to the fixed 1-CCEI and set V [X] equal to 0.00158 and
solve simultaneously for µ and σ. Once, these parameters of the log-normal
distribution have been calculated, create a truncated log-normal distribu-
tion9 based on the derived moment conditions of the log-normal distribution
above. Once this is done, take random draws from the truncated distribu-
tion. This is then repeated for each household given their specific CCEI for
each GARP sequence.
Prices were drawn randomly from a uniform distribution10
5The number of consideration sets is chosen randomly and roughly follows the Stanford Basket
Dataset in terms of frequency.
6Recall that CCEI=0/1 signifies perfection irrationality/rationality.
71st moment being the fixed CCEI and the 2nd moment being based on the 2nd moment of
the original sequence length 2 CCEIs from the Stanford Basket Dataset.
8Variance of CCEIs for the Stanford Basket Dataset (sequence length = 2).
9Truncated between 0 and 1 inclusive.
10Using same range as the prices in the Stanford Basket Dataset Random prices. Drawing from
any of the common distributions and any positive range did not affect any of the simulations.
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C. Construct feasibility constraints for each bundle.11
Given the randomly drawn CCEIs, construct CCEI equations based on the
definition of the CCEI. Recall that the CCEI for sequence length 2 is the
maximum between 2 numbers. To ensure that the highest CCEIs are chosen,
another set of equations with lower CCEIs must be constructed.
Solve the above system of equations (feasibility constraints, both sets of
CCEI equations and non-negativity) in order to get a dataset of goods pur-
chased per week.12
D. Run a Monte-Carlo Simulation.
i.e. run the above steps 250 times whilst collecting all the data needed for
constructing the tables in section A.2, then take averages over the collected
data to get the required numbers.
e.g. calculate the MPI13 (sequence length 3) 250 times and take an average.
Two inconveniences arise when doing these data simulations. As mentioned pre-
viously, the number of GARP cycles that need to be checked can be extremely
large. For a sequence length of L, the number of calculations is equal to
 26
L
 ∗ (L− 1)! (A.3.9)
As can be imagined, this is computationally heavy, as the calculations are also
done per household (494). For example, sequence lengths 5, 6 and, 7 involve
502,822,320 calculations per household(!).
Secondly, there is an associated ‘curse of dimensionality’ when simulating con-
sumption choices for specific CCEIs. For example, for the 20 goods (G)and 20
bundles (B) case, this implies 400 variables, and at least 400 equations. Solving
such a large system is not a trivial computational task as, again, this must be done
11Based on a uniform random draw from 1 to 100, again, simulations were not affected by
distribution or range.
12As a check, I calculated the CCEIs for the dataset and compare to the randomly drawn
CCEIs.
13Average MPI across all households.
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for each household. Also, as to improve the robustness of the results, this was done
250 times for the Monte Carlo simulations. This implies 123,500 systems of equa-
tions involving 49,400,000 equations and variables. The issue of dimensionality
arises mostly from the number of households and the Monte Carlo simulations.
In fact, reducing the number of households and Monte Carlo simulations did not
significantly alter the results.
A.3.3 Results
Table A - Frequency of Equivalence Classes
Number of Longest possible partition Frequency
equivalence classes sequence length
4 9 1
5 8 2
6 7 3
7 6 7
8 5 15
9 4 34
10 3 80
11 2 100
12 1 252
Table B - Rationality indices summary statistics without consideration sets
Cycle Lengths 2 2,3 2,3,4 2,3,4,5
Total number of households 494 494 494 494
Households violating GARP 405 405 405 405
Average MPI 0.1234 0.1200 0.1197 0.1166
Average GAV Index 0.1540 0.1541 0.1433 0.1422
Average (1-CCEI) 0.1543 0.1321 0.1306 0.1265
Median MPI 0.1187 0.1045 0.1044 0.1044
Median GAV Index 0.1345 0.1348 0.1301 0.1388
Median (1-CCEI) 0.1078 0.1084 0.1023 0.1020
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Table C - Rationality indices summary statistics with consideration sets
Cycle Lengths 2 2,3 2,3,4 2,3,4,5
Number of households 142 142 62 28
Households violating GARP 130 130 50 25
Average MPI 0.1321 0.1245 0.1144 0.1133
Average GAV Index 0.1299 0.1233 0.1111 0.1096
Average (1-CCEI) 0.1081 0.1053 0.1051 0.1040
Median MPI 0.1354 0.1377 0.1387 0.1354
Median GAV Index 0.1367 0.1300 0.1255 0.1199
Median (1-CCEI) 0.1054 0.1044 0.1047 0.1089
Table D - Rationality indices summary statistics with consideration sets with 4 to
12 goods
Consideration set size 4-7 8 9 10 11 12
Number of households 142 100 99 40 41 22
Households violating GARP 130 90 90 29 24 14
Average sequence length 1.88 1.78 1.77 1.78 1.64 1.66
Average MPI 0.1321 0.1333 0.1376 0.1578 0.1823 0.1938
Average GAV Index 0.1299 0.1426 0.1789 0.1866 0.2098 0.2107
Average (1-CCEI) 0.1081 0.1254 0.1289 0.1356 0.1401 0.1444
Median MPI 0.1354 0.1061 0.1062 0.1211 0.1465 0.1499
Median GAV Index 0.1367 0.1421 0.1533 0.1699 0.1976 0.2033
Median (1-CCEI) 0.1054 0.1176 0.1211 0.1289 0.1343 0.1349
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The results for the simulated data follow the patterns found in the empirical
dataset, hence I refer the reader to the main text. However, the only additional
observation is that the results seem to be exacerbated for agents that start off as
being more irrational for smaller consideration sets. This again corroborates the
idea that larger consideration sets are not necessarily facilitating the making of
more rational choices.
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A.4 Statistical Test for GAV Index
Let pi = Ki + µi denote mis-measured prices.
Let θi denote income shares.
Assume that is µi
θi
i.i.d and normally distributed with mean 0, and variance σ
2
θ2i
.
Take qN+1 = q1, PN+1 = p1, θN+1 = θ1 as given.
Let H(N) denote the statistical distribution for the GAV index of length N.
H(N) = max
 1
N
N∑
i=1
pi ∗ (qi − qi+1)
θi
, 0
 (A.4.1)
Note the max operator is required as GARP is violated when the GAV index
is negative i.e. the law of demand is violated. Let pi
θi
= Ki+µi
θi
be denoted as
Xi = Yi + ωi
H(N) = max
 1
N
N∑
i=1
Xi ∗ (qi − qi+1), 0
 (A.4.2)
Let G(N) denote the statistical distribution of the GAV Index, under the null
hypothesis of rationality.
G(N) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Xi ∗ (qi − qi+1) (A.4.3)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(Yi + ωi) ∗ (qi − qi+1) (A.4.4)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
Yi ∗ (qi − qi+1) +
N∑
i=1
ωi ∗ (qi − qi+1) (A.4.5)
By Afriat’s Theorem, the law of negativity must hold which implies that for every
bundle, (Yi−Yi+1)(qi−qi+1) ≤ 0. Combining this with the fact that ωi is assumed
to be mean 0 for all time periods, then all that is left to calculate is the variance
of G(N), conditional on the observed bundles. Under the i.i.d assumption, it is
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clear that
V ar(G(N)) = V ar
 1
N
N∑
i=1
ωi ∗ (qi − qi+1)
 (A.4.6)
=
1
N2
N∑
i=1
V ar[ωi] ∗ (qi − qi+1) (A.4.7)
=
1
N2
N∑
i=1
σ2
θ2i
∗ (qi − qi+1) (A.4.8)
as stated in the main text.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Sufficiency. Suppose the inequalities of Theorem 1 holds. Define the following
utility function as follows:
U(q) = min
t∈T
{ut + λt
[
p′t + β
′
tc
′(qt)
] ∗ (q− qt)} (B.1.1)
Given that q 6= θ2 and λ > 0, if p′t + β′tc′(qt) > 0, then U(q) is increasing in q.1
Note that as c′(q) is almost flat, and β ≤ p, this is not a very restrictive technical
assumption. In light of this, define p˜t = p
′
t + β
′
tc
′(qt) which yields:
U(q) = min
t∈T
{ut + λtp˜t ∗ (q− qt)} (B.1.2)
If the inequalities from Theorem 1 are to hold, it must be that they are consistent
with a (concave) utility function that rationalises D. This is to say that, it must
be shown that U(qs) = us and U(qk) ≤ us, ∀k ∈ T when prices are ps.
U(qs) = mint∈T {ut + λtp˜ ∗ (qs − qt)} which is clearly minimised at t = s. This
implies that
U(qs) = us
Now note that ps
′qk ≤ ps′qs =⇒ U(qk) ≤ U(qs)
1Another desirable property of c(q) is that c′(q) is concave.
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By definition U(qk) ≤ us + λsp˜s ∗ (qk − qs)
As λsp˜s > 0 and ps
′qk ≤ ps′qs =⇒
U(qk) ≤ us + λsp˜s ∗ (qk − qs) ≤ us =⇒
U(qk) ≤ U(qs) which is true ∀k ∈ T
Necessity. Given the concavity of the utility function, convexity of the con-
straint, and the first order conditions from the utility maximisation process, the
following Afriat-style inequalities can be derived using an appropriate Taylor-series
expansion of the utility function.
U(qj) ≤ U(qi) + U ′(qi)(qj − qi) (B.1.3)
uj ≤ ui + λi
[
p′i + β
′
ic
′(q)
] ∗ (qj − qi) (B.1.4)
It is clear that the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions have been used to
get the above expression for the inequality. The question remains as to whether
the KKT conditions are themselves necessary and sufficient for optimality of the
consumer maximisation problem. If this is the case, then the inequalities must be
necessary for optimality. It is well known that the KKT conditions are necessary
conditions for constrained optimisation problems. The problem lies in trying to
establish whether they are also sufficient. In the case of a convex optimisation
problem, I have to ensure that Slater’s condition holds. If this is the case, then
the KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient for optimality.2 Slater’s condition
says:
If ∃ x ∈ Rn such that p′x + c(x) < y, there there must exist a solution that
maximises the objective function such that the KKT conditions hold. Clearly, it
is possible to set x >> θ2 but also sufficiently small such that the CSC holds with
strict inequality.
2Note that it is not strictly enough that we have convexity of the constraints as the util-
ity function is defined over the entire real line, whereas the constraints are not continuously
differentiable at all points. If this were the case, it would again be trivial to proof necessity.
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B.2 Table 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
beta beta beta exp beta exp
MidFMSize -0.000925 -0.000925 -0.164 -0.164
(-13.14) (-13.13) (-13.51) (-13.50)
LarFMSize 0.00236 0.00236 0.247 0.247
(24.04) (24.06) (14.60) (14.62)
MidIncome -0.00108 -0.00108 -0.267 -0.267
(-13.61) (-13.60) (-19.47) (-19.45)
HighIncome 0.000905 0.000906 0.00135 0.00155
(9.83) (9.84) (0.08) (0.10)
MidAge -0.00170 -0.00170 -0.301 -0.301
(-22.43) (-22.44) (-23.03) (-23.04)
OldAge -0.00112 -0.00112 -0.267 -0.267
(-11.45) (-11.46) (-15.74) (-15.75)
Highsch 0.000382 0.000383 0.0265 0.0266
(2.90) (2.90) (1.16) (1.17)
college 0.000935 0.000935 0.147 0.147
(6.85) (6.85) (6.26) (6.26)
CCEI -0.00738 -2.004
(0.54) (0.84)
1-MPI -0.00289 -0.467
(0.34) (0.32)
Constant 0.00423 0.00423 0.861 0.860
(26.81) (26.79) (31.63) (31.59)
Observations 156000 156000 156000 156000
t statistics in parentheses
B.3 Dimensionality Issues
B.3.1 Dimensionality Issue
The following subsection below highlights the issue of modelling and deducing
consideration sets in a revealed preference approach.
Define a finite dataset, D = {pt,qt}t∈T
Let Dk be the k
th partition of D, k = 1, ...j
KT is the T
th Bell number such KT =
T−1∑
z=0
(
T−1
Z
)
Kz , K0 = 1.
For example, if T = 4 (i.e. 4 observations), the maximum number of ways of
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partitioning the data is 52. This means that for a dataset with only 4 observa-
tions, there are 15 potential combinations of consideration sets. As T grows large,
this grows exponentially; for T = 6/7/8, the maximum number of partitions is
877/4140/21147.
Denoting card(Dk) = j implies there are j consideration sets for dataset, D
i.e. the number of partitions denotes the number of consideration sets. Clearly,
sup
k
{card(Dk)} = T .
For illustration, suppose T=3, the partitions of D are:
S1 = {{p1,q1}, {p2,q2}, {p3,q3}}
S2 = {{p1,q1,p2,q2}, {p3,q3}}
S3 = {{p1,q1,p3,q3}, {p2,q2}}
S4 = {{p1,q1}, {p2,q2,p3,q3}}
S5 = {p1,q1,p2,q2,p3,q3}
Here, S1, S2, S4, S5 make intuitive sense as potential partitions (in terms of con-
sideration sets). In general, the number of possible consideration set configurations
will be far fewer than KT . A sensible assumption would be that once a good is
in the consideration set, it remains a part of all future consideration sets. This
is also commonly made assumption in the literature. Here, S3 implies decisions
in t = 1, 3 came from one consideration set, but decisions in t = 2 are somehow
separate. Given the above assumption, choices from t = 1, 3 could only have come
from a consideration set that involves all periods in-between as well i.e. S5 would
be the only accommodating partition.
This implies that the new maximum number of ways of partitioning the data
is KˆT = 2
T−1, Kˆ0 = 1 which is clearly much lower than KT .
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Proofs
C.1.1 Theorem 2
As an outline of the proof, it starts with showing that there is a binary relation on
the alternatives space which is a semiorder. This essential initial step is required
in order to get the JND utility function representation such as in the definitions
of the sets above. Then, it must be shown that the choice correspondence only
chooses the “near-maximal” elements according to the JND utility function. The
final step is then to show that a choice problem with a status quo is equivalent to
a choice problem without a status quo, but as if the choice set was reduced, in the
sense that only elements that have beaten the status quo remain.
Proof. ⇒ Sufficiency
The first step is to prove that the binary relation is a semiorder by showing it sat-
isfies irreflexitivity, semitransitivity, and the interval order condition (IOC). These
properties will be defined precisely below.
Recall that y  x iff y ∈ c({x, y}, x) and x 6∈ c({x, y}, y).1
1See Sen (1971) for a comprehensive survey of binary relations and choice functions
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 is irreflexive if a  a is false for all a ∈ X.
Suppose a, b ∈ X and a  b. By definition, we have a ∈ c({a, b}, b) and
b 6∈ c({a, b}, a). As the choice correspondence cannot be empty, by definition,
this can never hold true when a = b, this implies that  is irreflexive.
 is semitransitive if ∀a, b, c, d ∈ X, a  b ∧ b  c =⇒ a  d ∨ d  c.
Starting with a ∈ c({a, b}, b), b 6∈ c({a, b}, a), b ∈ c({b, c}, c), and c 6∈ c({b, c}, b),
by Axiom α, b 6∈ c({a, b, c, d}, a) and c 6∈ c({a, b, c, d}, b). This first step will
be to show that a  d can be obtained. Using Axiom ASQB, initially set
A ∪ B = {a, b, c, d}(= A). Suppose a ∈ c({a, b, c, d}, a). By Axiom ASQB,
a = c({a, b, c, d}, a) which implies b, c, d 6∈ c({a, b, c, d}, a). Again, by Axiom
ASQB, b, c, d 6∈ c({a, b, c, d}, b). By iterative applications of Axiom ASQB, b, c, d 6∈
c({a, b, c, d}, c) and b, c, d 6∈ c({a, b, c, d}, d). This implies that a ∈ c({a, b, c, d}, a),
a ∈ c({a, b, c, d}, b), a ∈ c({a, b, c, d}, c), and a ∈ c({a, b, c, d}, d). By Axiom
α, a ∈ c({a, d}, d). Recall that a = c({a, b, c, d}, a) and Axiom α implies that
a = c({a, d}, a) =⇒ d 6∈ c({a, d}, a). Hence a  d is obtained.
Now, to show that d  c can be obtained, suppose that A ∪ B = {a, b, c, d} with
A = {a, b, c} and B = {d}. Again, b 6∈ c({a, b, c, d}, a) and c 6∈ c({a, b, c, d}, b).
To show d  c, using Axiom ASQB, a ∈ c({A ∪ B}, a) but now only elements
in B can also belong to this set when a becomes the status quo. This means
that b 6∈ c({A ∪ B}, a) and c 6∈ c({A ∪ B}, a). By Axiom ASQB, there is also
d ∈ c({A∪B}, a). However, as c 6∈ c({A∪B}, a) this yields c 6∈ c({A∪B}, d). By
Axiom ASQB, b, c 6∈ c({A ∪ B}, c) which means a, d ∈ c({A ∪ B}, c). So, by Ax-
iom α, d ∈ c({d, c}, c). To complete the proof for semitransitivity, c 6∈ c({c, d}, d)
needs to be shown. Suppose that c ∈ c({c, d}, d). As d ∈ c({c, d}, d) and
d ∈ c({A ∪ B}, d), by Axiom δ, c ∈ c({A ∪ B}, d), which is a contradiction.
This must mean that c 6∈ c({c, d}, d). Thus d  c is obtained and hence  is
semitransitive.
 satisfies the IOC if ∀a, b, c, d ∈ X, a  b ∧ c  d =⇒ a  d ∨ c  b.
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Starting with a ∈ c({a, b}, b), b 6∈ c({a, b}, a), c ∈ c({c, d}, d), and d 6∈ c({c, d}, c),
by Axiom α, b 6∈ c({a, b, c, d}, a) and d 6∈ c({a, b, c, d}, c). By Axiom DSQB, there
are two cases to consider. The case where only {a, b} or {c, d} have (potential)
status quo effects.
Consider the first case. By Axiom DSQB, a ∈ c({a, b, c, d}, a) and c 6∈ c({a, b, c, d}, a).
By Axiom DSQB or Axiom ASQB, b 6∈ c({a, b, c, d}, a) and d 6∈ c({a, b, c, d}, a)
as b 6∈ c({a, b, c, d}, a) and d 6∈ c({a, b, c, d}, c). However, this implies that a =
c({a, b, c, d}, a), which by Axiom αimplies that d 6∈ c({a, d}, a). Now suppose that
a 6∈ c({a, b, c, d}, d), but this cannot be true by Axiom DSQB or Axiom ASQB,
as a ∈ c({a, b, c, d}, a). So, a ∈ c({a, b, c, d}, d) and by Axiom α, a ∈ c({a, d}, d).
Hence a  d is obtained.
In the other case, using Axiom DSQB yields c ∈ c({a, b, c, d}, c) and a 6∈ c({a, b, c, d}, c).
By symmetry of the above argument, c  b is obtained.
Combined with the first case, this shows that  satisfies the interval order condi-
tion.
As per above,  is an irreflexive semitransitive binary relation that satisfies the
interval order condition, hence,  is a semiorder on X.
The rest of the proof follows that of Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 of Masatlioglu and
Ok (2005). Define D(x) ≡ {y ∈ S|y  x} and d(x) ≡ {y ∈ S : ¬y  x ∧ ¬x  y}.
Let ./i denote the binary relation in the absence of i or ≺i.
First assume D(x) = ∅. Suppose y ∈ c(S, x), by Axiom α, y ∈ c({x, y}, x). By
Axiom ASQB/Axiom DSQB, y = c({x, y}, y) which implies that x 6∈ c({x, y}, y)
which yields the contradiction that D(x) 6= ∅. This means that y  x is not
possible for any y ∈ S. If ¬(y  x), this means that either x  y or x ./ y. If
it is the case that all y that x  y, then clearly c(S, x) = {x}. However, as it is
possible that there are some y ∈ S such that x ./ y, then x ∈ c(S, x) = d(x).
Now assume that D(x) 6= ∅. Suppose y ∈ c(S, x), by Axiom α, y ∈ c({x, y}, x). By
Axiom ASQB/Axiom DSQB, y = c({x, y}, y) which implies that x 6∈ c({x, y}, y)
which implies that y ∈ D(x). If y = x then y 6∈ c({x, y}, x), ∀y ∈ S implying
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D(x) = ∅. By contradiction, it must be that c(S, x) ⊆ D(x) as no y can be equal
to x.
To complete the sufficiency part of the proof, it must be shown that a choice
problem with a status quo is equivalent to a choice problem without a status
quo but with goods only superior to the status quo, i.e. when D(x) 6= ∅ then
c(S, x) = c(D(x), ). Starting with c(S, x), as D(x) 6= ∅, this implies that there ex-
ists y ∈ c(S, x). By Axiom α , y ∈ c(D(x)∪{x}, x). As x 6∈ c(D(x)∪{x}, x) for any
subset of D(x)∪ {x}, applying Axiom SQI , it must be that y ∈ c(D(x)∪ {x}, ).
Applying Axiom α yields y ∈ c(D(x), ) as required.
Now suppose that y, z ∈ c(D(x), ). By Axiom δ, if z ∈ c(D(x) ∪ {x}, ),
then it must be that y ∈ c(D(x) ∪ {x}, ) as z 6= c(D(x) ∪ {x}, ). Also, as
D(x) 6= ∅, this implies that x 6∈ c({x, y}, x) implying y = c({x, y}, x). By Axiom
D, y ∈ c(D(x)∪{x}, x), which by Axiom α gives y ∈ c(D(x), x). For an arbitrary
w ∈ c(S, x), by Axiom α, w ∈ c(D(x), x). Applying Axiom δ yields y ∈ c(S, x) as
required.
Taking the choice correspondence that satisfies Axiom α, Axiom δ, Axiom D, Ax-
iom SQI, Axiom ASQB, and Axiom DSQB, there exists a u : S → R and a  such
that y  x ⇐⇒ u(y) > u(x) + . As the choice correspondence satisfies Axiom
α, Axiom δ, Axiom ASQB, and Axiom DSQB, and |S| <∞, it must be that there
exists a subset of the choice set that has only maximal elements according to a just
noticeable difference utility function i.e. c(S, ) = Ω(S), ∀S. This is also trivially
true for when there is a status quo i.e. c(S, x) = Ω(Γ(S, x)). Additionally, as shown
above, when D(x) = ∅, then x ∈ c(S, x) = d(x) ≡ {y ∈ S : ¬y  x ∧ ¬x  y}.
In combination with the above axioms, it must be that when D(x) = ∅, then
c(S, x) = Π(S, x).
⇐ Necessity
Given the choice correspondence and representation above, Axiom α, Axiom δ,
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Axiom D, Axiom SQI, Axiom ASQB, and Axiom DSQB, need to be proven.2
Axiom α: y ∈ c(A, x) = Ω(Γ(A, x)). As y ∈ B ⊆ A, y ∈ Ω(Γ(B, x)) =⇒ y ∈
c(B, x).
Axiom δ: {z, y} ∈ Ω(Γ(S, x)). As y ∈ S ⊆ T , for any , it can never be that
y is the unique choice as z is sufficiently similar i.e. it cannot be the case that
{y} ∈ Ω(Γ(T, x))
Axiom D: {y} = c(S, x) = Ω(Γ(S, x)), S ⊆ T and y ∈ c(T, ) = Ω(Γ(T, )). As
x ∈ S ⊆ T and x ∈ T , then, y ∈ Γ(T, x). As y ∈ Ω(Γ(T, )) and y ∈ Γ(T, x), then
y ∈ Ω(Γ(T, x)) =⇒ y ∈ c(T, x).
Axiom SQI: y ∈ Ω(Γ(S, x)). As @ any T ⊆ S such that x ∈ c(T, x), this means
that Ω(Γ(S, x)) = Ω(Γ(S, )). Hence, y ∈ Ω(Γ(S, )) =⇒ y ∈ c(S, )
Axiom ASQB: y ∈ Ω(Γ(A, x)) and y ∈ Ω(Γ(A ∪ B, x)). By definition, y ∈
Γ(A ∪ B, x) = {p ∈ A ∪ B : v(p) > v(x) + }. As y is part of the set which
beats x in A ∪ B, there does not exist any element that outright beats y as
y ∈ c(A ∪ B, x). This implies that {p ∈ A ∪ B : v(p) > v(y) + } = ∅. By def-
inition, y ∈ c(A ∪ B, y) = Π(A ∪ B, y). Note that y ∈ c(A, y) = Π(A, y) is also
true as y ∈ Ω(Γ(A, x)). As y ∈ Π(A ∪ B, y) must also hold, when the choice set
is augmented from A to A ∪ B, then y ∪ B′ ∈ Π(A ∪ B, y), for some potentially
nonempty B′ ⊆ B.
Axiom DSQB: y ∈ Ω(Γ(A, x)) and v ∈ Ω(Γ(B,w)). These imply that y ∈
c(A, y) = Π(A, y) and v ∈ c(B, v) = Π(B, v) as above. When choices become A∪B
then there can exist some B′ ⊆ B such that y ∪ B′ ⊆ Γ(A ∪ B, y) = c(A ∪ B, y).
Alternatively, the other possibility is that v ∪ A′ ⊆ Γ(A ∪ B, v) = c(A ∪ B, v) for
2Showing the axioms hold is a fairly trivial task, but is included for constructiveness and
exposition.
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some A′ ⊆ A. Considering the case when y ∈ c(A ∪B, y), then as y ∈ Ω(Γ(A, x))
for any x ∈ A, in particular, when v = x. By definition of Γ(·, ·), it must be that
y is not dominated by v, and, by definition, v 6∈ c(A ∪B, y).
C.1.2 Corollary 2.1
Proof. Virtually identical to the proof of Theorem 2 except in the last step where
an interval order utility exists such that y IO x ⇐⇒ u(y) > u(x) + (x). Note
that this is one form of the representation; as by the nomenclature, it is possible
to assign utility as closed intervals of R to alternatives such that y  ˆIO x ⇐⇒
ay > bx where ux = [ax, bx] and uy = [ay, by].
3
C.1.3 Implication 2.1
Proof. Apply the proof of Theorem 2, and use the fact that 1) Axiom SQB can be
formed as a special case of combining both Axiom ASQB and Axiom DSQB and
setting B = ∅. Recall the definition for Axiom β, for any (B, x), if z, y ∈ c(B, x),
B ⊆ A, and z ∈ c(A, x). Clearly, if this holds, then Axiom δ holds.
C.1.4 Lemma 2.1
As a brief outline of the theorem below, what needs to be shown is how a change
in a single characteristic can effect the overall choice of the good. This needs to be
true for all of the characteristics in order to establish logical consistency with the
aggregation. The proof closely follows the literature on social welfare functions
Proof. ⇒ Sufficiency
Let {z1, ..., zJ} be denoted by Z and {z1, ..., xj, ..., zJ} denoted by (z−j, xj).
What ultimately needs to be proven is that that when uj(xj) = uj(yj) for all
j ≤ J , that U(X) = U(Y ).
In order for this aggregation to represent all the characteristics, the following need
to be shown:
3It is easy to go from one form of representation to the other, but the chosen initial repre-
sentation is easier given how Theorem 2 is proven.
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if uj(xj) ≥ uj(yj) =⇒ U(z−j, xj) ≥ U(z−j, yj) and uj(xj) > uj(yj) =⇒
U(z−j, xj) > U(z−j, yj).
Firstly, assume that uj(xj) ≥ uj(yj) =⇒ U(x) < U(y). By assumption, there
exists a wi such that U(z−j, yj) > U(z−j, wj) > U(z−j, xj). By SC, there are 4 pos-
sible chains of preference that can occur per characteristic i.e. A yj j wj j xj,
B yj j wj ./+j xj, C yj ./+j wj j xj, and D yj ./+j wj ./+j xj.
Starting with A , uj(yj) - uj(wj) > j and uj(wj) - uj(xj) > j imply by addition
that uj(yj) - uj(xj) > 2j. This means that uj(yj) - uj(xj) > 0 (as j > 0) and
uj(yj) > uj(xj) which is a contradiction.
B yields uj(yj) - uj(wj) > j and 0 <uj(wj) - uj(xj) ≤ j
0 < uj(wj)− uj(xj) ≤ j < uj(yj)− uj(wj)
2uj(wj)− 2uj(xj) < uj(yj)− uj(xj)
as uj(wj)− uj(xj) > 0
0 < uj(yj)− uj(xj)
uj(yj) > uj(xj)
which is a contradiction.
Similarly C yields uj(wj) - uj(xj) > j and 0 <uj(yj) - uj(wj) ≤ j
0 < uj(yj)− uj(wj) ≤ j < uj(wj)− uj(xj)
2uj(yj)− 2uj(wj) < uj(yj)− uj(xj)
0 < uj(yj)− uj(xj)
uj(yj) > uj(xj)
which again is a contradiction as uj(yj)− uj(wj) > 0.
D gives 0 < uj(yj) − uj(wj) ≤ j and 0 < uj(wj) − uj(xj) ≤ j. By addition,
0 < uj(yj) − uj(xj) ≤ 2j which leads to uj(yj) − uj(xj) > 0 which is the final
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contradiction. So if uj(xj) ≥ uj(yj) =⇒ U(z−j, xj) ≥ U(z−j, yj) holds for any
j ≤ J .
To show uj(xj) > uj(yj) =⇒ U(z−j, xj) > U(z−j, yj), given the range of ui(·),
there exists a wi such that uj(xj) > uj(wj) + j > uj(yj) + j > uj(wj) > uj(yj).
By definition, xj j wj and ¬[yj j wj] ∧ yj ./−j wj.4 By SC’, (z−j, xj)W(z−j, wj)
and ¬[(z−j, yj)W(z−j, wj)]. By definition,
U(z−j, xj) > U(z−j, wj) ≥ U(z−j, yj)
U(z−j, xj) > U(z−j, yj)
as required.
To finish the proof, note that uj(xj) ≥ uj(yj) =⇒ U(z−j, xj) ≥ U(z−j, yj) holds
for any j ≤ J . As this holds for any j ≤ J and for arbitrary (z−j, zj), then by an
inductive argument, it must be the case that if uj(xj) ≥ uj(yj) for all j ≤ J , then
U(X) ≥ U(Y ). Note that if uj(xj) ≤ uj(yj) for all j ≤ J , then U(X) ≤ U(Y )
which implies that if uj(xj) = uj(yj) for all j ≤ J , then U(X) = U(Y ) where
U(X) = g(u1(x1), ..., uJ(xJ)). Given the above constructive proof, g(·) is clearly
strictly monotonic.
⇐ Necessity
Assume there exists a strictly monotone function g : Rn → R such that U(X) =
g(u1(x1), ..., uJ(xJ)). Starting with SC, assume (z−j, xj)W(z−j, yj) which means
that U(z−j, xj) > U(z−j, yj). By definition:
g(u1(x1), ..., uj(xj), ..., uJ(xJ)) > g(u1(x1), ..., uj(yj), ..., uJ(xJ)).
As g(·) is strictly monotonic, this implies uj(xj) > uj(yj). This means that either
uj(xj) > uj(yj) + j > uj(yj) or uj(yj) > uj(xj) > uj(yj) which yield xj j yj
and xj ./
+
j yj, respectively. Now, assume that xj j yj which means uj(xj) >
uj(yj)+j. This implies that uj(xj) > uj(yj). It must be true that when comparing
4Note that ¬[wj j yj ] is obtained but it is not true that wj ./−j yj . In fact, this simply
corroborates the fact that yj and wj are indistinguishable with yj worse than wj in pure utility.
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all the characteristics such that g(u−j(x−j), uj(xj)) with g(u−j(x−j), uj(yj)) that
g(u−j(x−j), uj(xj)) > g(u−j(x−j), uj(yj)). By definition, (z−j, xj)W(z−j, yj). As
this holds for any arbitrary (z−j, zj), this completes the necessity of SC.5
C.2 Aggregation
Analogously to Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), suppose now that the domain of op-
tions is expanded such that there are set of finite alternatives which are charac-
terised by a set of finite features/characteristics i.e. an alternative is defined by a
list of characteristics. The status quo could then potentially eliminate alternatives
that are worse than it in any dimension/characteristic. The agent, in principle,
can have a choice correspondence for each characteristic of the alternatives. This
can be achieved simply by applying Theorem 2 to each of the characteristics of the
alternatives. This means that the agent has semi-ordered preferences represented
by JND utility for each characteristic of the alternatives.6
The aim for this section is to tackle the issue of how an agent makes a decision
after analysing just the characteristics of the goods. In essence, is there a way to
consistently aggregate such semi-ordered preferences? How does an agent make
the final decision over alternatives from choices over characteristics? Returning to
our common example of buying a mobile phone, with the options being an iPhone,
Samsung, and Huawei. Suppose they are characterised by camera quality, screen
quality, and battery life. Conditional on each characteristic, the agent is able to
make a choice. The agent may not be able to compare each characteristic perfectly
5The proof of the necessity of SC’ is shown for exposition although virtually identical to SC
given it is its natural negation. For SC’, assume that ¬[xj j yj ] ∧ xi ./+i yi. By definition,
¬[uj(xj) > uj(yj) + j ] =⇒ uj(xj) ≤ uj(yj) + j and 0 < uj(xj) − uj(yj) ≤ j . Re-arranging
gives uj(yj) < uj(xj) ≤ uj(yj) + j . As uj(yj) < uj(xj) has to hold, by monotonicity of g(·),
it must be that, for any arbitrary (z−j , zj) that (z−j , xj)W(z−j , yj). For the second part of SC’
, ¬[xj j yj ] ∧ xi ./−i yi. Similarly, uj(xj) ≤ uj(yj) + j and 0 < uj(yj) − uj(xj) ≤ j which
after re-arranging gives uj(xj) < uj(yj) ≤ uj(xj) + j . Again, by monotonicity of g(·), it must
be that (z−j , xj)W(z−j , yj).
6Previously, the derived utility function was only single-valued. However, it may be desirable
to have a multi-valued utility functions as a way of representing an alternative, as the alternatives
can now be described by characteristics. Before, the role of the status quo was moderate as it
is always easy to compare utility numbers. However, if there were a vector-valued utility, then
the status quo could eliminate on the basis of any of these characteristics.
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as it may be difficult to perceive technological differences and/or characteristics
may be approximately similar to human perception, etc... Given each of those
conditional choices, is there a way to make a final decision between an iPhone,
Samsung, and Huawei? The purpose of this section is to answer this type of
question i.e. given the characteristic choices, what restrictions do we need on the
overall preferences to get a consistent choice?
As alluded to, the ensuing consistency restrictions for aggregation will use
preferences over alternatives as the premise for the following analysis. One reason
for this is to bring it in line with social choice theory where individuals’ prefer-
ences are aggregated by a social planner. Analogously, an individual may wish
to aggregate characteristics of alternatives, in order to establish a ranking over
the alternatives themselves. For example, if someone prefers the iPhone camera
over a Samsung camera over a Huawei camera, but prefers the Huawei screen over
the iPhone screen over the Samsung screen, is there a way to rank the iPhone,
Samsung, and Huawei phones in a consistent way? So, if we observe the semi-
ordered preferences of the agent over characteristics, what consistency restrictions
are required on semi-ordered/weak-ordered preferences of the alternatives? This is
what is addressed below; given that semi-ordered preferences over characteristics
are observed, what restrictions do we need to get consistent preferences over the
alternatives?
The interesting contribution here is that the semi-ordered preferences over char-
acteristics are not just simply assumed, but rather, have an axiomatic foundation
in status quo bias. In other words, it is assumed that there is a semi-ordering in
preferences over characteristics, but the behavioural explanation for this is sta-
tus quo bias. Thus, for the following analysis, the full preference ranking over
characteristics is needed to get the preference ranking over the alternatives.
Typically, in order to derive a (finite) vector-valued utility function, it is com-
mon to use Szpilrajn’s Theorem (Szpilrajn (1930)).7 In brief summary, by taking
all of the linear orders C{1,...,i,...,n} such that ⊆ Ci ∀i, where  is a weak partial
7Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) and Ok (2002) for further details.
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order (WPO), standard results give us that these linear orders are representable
by regular utility functions.8 Stacking these standard utility functions is then
what gives the vector-valued utility function.9 However, as described previously,
it may be the case that agents have semi-ordered preferences over characteristics.
This means that this type of approach will not be appropriate as what would
be required is stacking/aggregating semiorders rather than standard weak orders.
Before showing an adequate method of aggregation, Example 4 illustrates what it
means to aggregate semi-ordered preferences.
Example 3 Suppose that X ≡ {i, j, k, l,m, x} with u(x) = (4, 4, 4), u(i) =
(0, 0, 0), u(j) = (4, 5, 7), u(k) = (4, 2, 4), u(l) = (7, 6, 5), and u(m) = (8, 7, 6).
If the JND for each dimension of the vector utility is 1 = 2 = 3 = 1, the status
quo, x, eliminates i and k as x is noticeably better than k in the 2nd dimension
of utility, and noticeably better than i in all dimensions of utility. However, what
should be chosen from j, l, and m, given the semi-ordered preferences in each
dimension of utility? What is clear is that m is better (although not noticeably)
than l in all dimensions. It would make sense, ex-ante, that l would effectively
be eliminated by m. Indeed, the final choice of good will always depend on the
intrinsic preferences of the agent, however, the aggregation should exhibit a form
of monotonicity (in vectors), as described with l and m. Suppose the aggregator
is simply the sum of elements, then m is clearly the final good chosen. Even
though the characteristics are not noticeably different, when the agent is judging
a product as an entire set of characteristics, then the agent can take into account
that a product is inferior even if it is marginally worse.
This example illustrates the fact that, although characteristics of certain prod-
ucts are not so easy to compare, the inferiority/superiority of a characteristic
8A WPO is a binary relation that is reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric.
9Note that a semiorder is just a strict partial order (SPO). A WPO can be converted to an
SPO by removing its reflexive components i.e. the SPO is the corresponding irreflexive kernel
such that only different elements can be compared. By working with the SPO and putting
structure on it such that it yields a semiorder, and then adjoining the semiorder with its reflexive
component gets back the WPO. This is required as Szpilrajn’s Theorem requires working with
the WPO. This is important detail in showing how the representation of Masatlioglu and Ok
(2005) is also obtainable from the above representation. This is guaranteed by the fact that
Axiom ASQB and Axiom DSQB imply Axiom SQB but not conversely.
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becomes more salient when comparing products as described by their features.
Consider another basic example of choosing a phone as described by its camera,
screen, and price. Conditional on the prices being similar, it may not be clear
which camera / screen is best suited for the agent, however, when buying their
phone, ultimately, the agent may realise that it is better to buy the phone which is
marginally “better”, even if the individual characteristics themselves are difficult
to compare.
Another reason for allowing such an aggregation is to ensure that incomplete-
ness is not a feature of this model i.e. the agent should always be able to com-
pare/make a choice between alternatives. Here, incompleteness arises due to the
assumed vector-valued utility.10 Aggregation of the vectors is an obvious way to
allow the agent to make easy comparisons.11 The following axiom is introduced
in order to be able to characterise such behaviour.
Denote {z1, ..., xj, ..., zJ} by (z−j, xj). Let W denote the weak order for aggregate
semi-ordered preferences i.e. (x−j, xj)W(z−j, xj) when U(x−j, xj)−U(z−j, xj) > 0.
Let j denote a semiorder for characteristic j. Assume that j is finite such that
j ∈ {1, ..., J}.
Let ./i denote the binary relation when neither i or ≺i hold i.e. xi ./i yi if, and
only if, |ui(xi) − ui(yi)| ≤ i. For what is about to become clear, let ./+i denote
the “positive” part of ./i such that xi ./
+
i yi if, and only if, 0 < ui(xi)−ui(yi) ≤ i
and let ./−i denote the “negative” part of ./i such that xi ./
−
i yi if, and only if,
0 < ui(yi)− ui(xi) ≤ i.12
Strong Consistency (SC) If (x−j, xj)W(x−j, yj) ⇐⇒ xj j yj or xj ./+j yj
For expositional purposes, let SC’ be the natural negation of SC.
10The ≥/≤ binary relation in the vector space is not complete.
11Manzini and Mariotti (2012) have a lexicographic choice procedure as a way of decision
making over an ordered list of semiorders.
12Both ./+i and ./
−
i are not required as they are logically dependent, however, they are defined
purely for clarity of the axiom.
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SC’

If ¬[xj j yj] ∧ xj ./+j yj ⇐⇒ (x−j, xj)W(x−j, yj)
or
If ¬[xj j yj] ∧ xj ./−j yj ⇐⇒ ¬[(x−j, xj)W(x−j, yj)]
SC is a natural form of monotonicity. In one direction, it says that if the agent
prefers a good (as completely described by its characteristics) due to one par-
ticular characteristic difference, in isolation, the agent must either noticeably or
“not noticeably” prefer that particular characteristic of the good. The converse
simply says that the choice of the characteristic defines the choice of the good,
ceteris paribus. This axiom is saying that if an agent chooses a good, at the very
least, this choice was made because the good was strictly better in one particular
characteristic, noticeably or otherwise.
This axiom highlights an interesting issue of aggregating the semi-ordered pref-
erences with a weak order. In order to achieve this form of consistency between
the weak order and the semiorders, what is required is that the agent may not
have noticed that a particular characteristic is better. Overall, the agent is still
able to make the best choice, even with imprecision in comparability of this dom-
inating characteristic. However, the agent had to know, at the very least, that
the good was definitely not worse. In this sense, the agent is able to better judge
the good as a whole set of characteristics than just the characteristics in isolation.
An equivalent interpretation could be that the agent may know a characteristic is
better or worse, but, in the specific choice of that characteristic, the agent is not
concerned if the characteristics are sufficiently similar.
SC’ is the natural negation of SC . It requires that if the agent does not prefer
a characteristic of a good, then the agent does not prefer the overall good as a
result of the characteristic, noticeably or otherwise. Note that the negation of
xj j yj means that the agent may actually just prefer yj over xj or that yj and
xj are indistinguishable. This means that the agent may actually get higher utility
from xj but not noticeably more than yj. As the weak order is meant to represent
noticeable choices, this axiom rules out behaviour where the agent may choose a
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good even if it is worse, but not noticeably, in some characteristic. As with SC,
this is a form of logical consistency in choices in order to aggregate the semiorders
with a weak order.
So, under SC (or SC’), and the assumption that the agent has weak-ordered
preferences over the goods, the aggregator for the semi-ordered preferences is also
representable by a weak order.
Lemma 2.1. Suppose there are semiorders {j}j∈{1,...,J} represented by
{uj, j}j∈{1,...,J} with weak order (over goods) W and corresponding U as above.
Assume that {uj}j∈{1,...,J} and U are continuous with range R. Strong Consis-
tency (or SC’ ) holds, if, and only if, there exists a strictly monotone aggregator
g : RJ → R such that U(x1, ..., xj, ..., xJ) = g(u1(x1), ..., uJ(xJ))
With Lemma 2.1, it is possible to aggregate the utilities of each characteristic of a
good with an aggregator that is strictly monotonic; moreover, this aggregator can
represent a weak order. This means that an agent is able to make standard choices
over goods even if there are degrees of imperceptibility in their characteristics,
where this difficulty to perceive may be due to status quo bias.
Building on this, the main representation theorem gave rise to a JND utility
representation of choices. As suggested, choices can be made per characteristic of
each alternative (in the phone example, screen quality, camera, etc...), rather than
simply the alternatives themselves. If we observe this full ranking of preferences
per characteristic, the above lemma suggests that a ranking over the alternatives
can be made in a way that is consistent with the semi-ordering in the preferences
of the characteristics. Specifically, the ranking over alternatives can be governed
by a weak order.
Consider the example above of buying a mobile phone, with the options being
an iPhone, Samsung, and Huawei, characterised by camera quality, screen quality,
and battery life. Suppose the consumer is comparing phones that do not vary
in camera quality or screen quality. In the battery life characteristic, the agent
is still indifferent but only within their JND i.e. the iPhone lasts for 12 hours,
Samsung for 11.5 hours, and Huawei for 11 hours but for the consumer, these
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are all similar enough to be indifferent. The above lemma says that, in the final
choice of product, the overall preferred option is the iPhone as it is slightly better
in the battery life characteristic. In some sense, if there is no change in any of the
characteristics but one, the tie break is decided by that one characteristic. So, in
the end, the agent just chooses the iPhone, even if they are not particularly fussed
by the improved battery life, given the identicalness of the other characteristics.
However, suppose that, even after aggregation of product characteristics, the
agent is still not able to perfectly perceive whether a good is preferred to another.
In essence, after aggregation, the overall choice of good may also be semi-ordered.
The following axiom comes directly from Argenziano and Gilboa (2018) and deals
perfectly with how to aggregate semi-ordered preferences with a semiorder.13
Let S denote the semiorder for aggregate semi-ordered preferences i.e.
(x−j, xj)S(x−j, yj) when Us(x−j, xj)− Us(x−j, yj) > s
Weak Consistency (WC) (x1, ..., xj, ..., xJ)S(x1, ..., yj, ..., xJ) ⇐⇒ xj j yj
This axiom says that, if all but one of the characteristics of a good differ, it must
be that this ordering is preserved when looking at that particular characteris-
tic in isolation. The other direction is simpler in that it says if the individual
has preferences in one characteristic and the other characteristics do not change,
then the aggregation is consistent with this ordering. Alongside WC, with the
assumption that preferences over the goods are semi-ordered, the aggregator for
the semi-ordered preferences is also representable by a semiorder. This is because
the sensitivity of the characteristic semiorders is represented by the aggregate
semiorder.
From above, it is clear why this axiom is not restrictive enough if the aggre-
gation is to be governed by a weak order. In essence, WC does not deal with
the imperceptibility across characteristics, as it does not need to given that the
aggregation is also in accordance with imperceptibility. Hence, SC is a stronger
condition on behaviour but also leads to a stricter representation of that behaviour.
13Argenziano and Gilboa (2018) name this simply Consistency, I re-name it weak consistency
for clarity of exposition.
127
Lemma 2.2. Suppose there are semiorders {j}j∈{1,...,J} represented by
{uj, j}j∈{1,...,J} as in Theorem 2, with semiorder (over goods) S and correspond-
ing Us as above. Assume that {uj}j∈{1,...,J} and U are continuous with range R.
Weak Consistency holds, if, and only if, there exists a strictly monotone aggregator
g : RJ → R such that Us(x1, ..., xj, ..., xJ) = g(u1(x1), ..., uJ(xJ))
Proof. Theorem 1 of Argenziano and Gilboa (2018)14
This lemma suggests that aggregation of the product characteristics can also
be governed by a semiorder as well. Consider the same example above of buying
a mobile phone, with the options being an iPhone, Samsung, and Huawei, charac-
terised by camera quality, screen quality, and battery life. Suppose the consumer
is comparing phones that do not vary in camera quality or screen quality. In the
battery life characteristic, the agent exhibits a strict preference for the iPhone’s
battery life (e.g. iPhone lasts for 12 hours as opposed to Samsung for 10 hours,
and Huawei for 8 hours). As this is the only characteristic that exhibits a strict
preference, then the agent chooses the iPhone. Thus, conditional on all the other
characteristics being the same, the strict preference from the remaining character-
istic carries through to the end choice.
14Argenziano and Gilboa (2018) take the representation a step further for their context. They
show there is also an additive structure possible if they enforce choices on a JND-grid (a subset
of choices where utility differences are multiples of the JND). In the current context of this
chapter, this would not be entirely appropriate, but, what is required and still holds, is that
such an aggregator does exist.
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